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THE PRACTICE OF  
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
JENS MEIERHENRICH* 
The tragedy of the world is that those who are imaginative have but slight experience, 
and those who are experienced have feeble imaginations. Fools act on imagination 
without knowledge, and pedants act on knowledge without imagination.
1
 
Alfred North Whitehead 
 
Out of the conjunction of activities and men around the law-jobs there arise the crafts 
of law, and so the craftsmen. Advocacy, counseling, judging, law-making, 
administering—these are the major grouping of the law-crafts. . . . At the present 
juncture, the fresh study of these crafts and of the manner of their best doing is one of 
the major needs of jurisprudence.
2
 
Karl Llewellyn 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The academic literature on the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been 
burgeoning for the past fifteen years, since the delegates of 160 states and 
scores of nongovernmental organizations assembled at the so-called Rome 
Conference in 1998. In the decade since the establishment of the ICC, in 2003, 
at its current Voorburg site in The Hague, an equally important set of writings 
has added to the already-tremendous burden facing any researcher seeking to 
comprehend the workings of international criminal law. As a consequence of 
the gradually expanding role of the ICC in international politics, a steadily 
growing number of filings and decisions, including the first judgment, has begun 
to coalesce into a jurisprudential library that only the most ardent observers 
stand any chance of ever mastering in all of its technical and substantive 
complexity. Whereas most scholars are liable to ensnare themselves in the maze 
of practice, most practitioners are prone to lose track of the latest contributions 
to scholarship. The developing intellectual risk, to borrow from Alfred North 
Whitehead, is that most of those who are theoretically imaginative about the 
 
Copyright © 2014 by Jens Meierhenrich.  
 This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
 *  Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and 
Political Science. 
 1.  ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, Universities and Their Function, in THE AIMS OF EDUCTION 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 93 (1967). 
 2.  K. N. Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN 
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 181, 188 (1941). 
1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:29 AM 
2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:1 
ICC have but slight experience, and most of those who are experienced with its 
operation have but feeble theoretical imaginations. 
In an effort to ward off the twin dangers of “imagination without 
knowledge” and “knowledge without imagination” in the study of international 
law, I provide theoretical tools designed to enable the advanced study of 
practices of international criminal law. By identifying empirically—and 
analyzing theoretically—a whole array of such everyday practices of the ICC, 
the symposium issue this article frames is designed to bring the logic of 
practices to the forefront of knowledge production in the study of international 
law.3 It is geared toward building an intellectual foundation on which scholars 
and practitioners can deliberate more fruitful ways of engaging each other’s 
very different lifeworlds than currently exist.  
By taking practices seriously in the study of international law, I seek to 
accomplish three objectives. First, I hope to draw attention to the fact that the 
ICC, like most other international courts, is not a black box. Although this 
insight is hardly revolutionary, the bulk of existing scholarship in International 
Law (IL) and International Relations (IR) alike has failed, in assessments of 
the effectiveness of the permanent international court, to factor in the causal 
and constitutive significance of institutional and organizational facets of 
bureaucratic life, whether they manifest themselves formally or informally.4 To 
be sure, I am not suggesting that the international politics of adjudication play 
no role in the determination of judicial outcomes in the international system. In 
the case of the ICC in particular, the preferences and strategies of states—and 
also of nonstate actors—have had a considerable effect on the initiation, nature, 
funding, progression, and outcomes of international legal efforts addressed 
toward the punishment of international crimes. From the UN Security Council 
to the Assembly of States Parties to the informal group of diplomats known as 
“friends of the court,” governmental representatives have exercised power—
sometimes successfully, sometimes not—over the operation of the ICC during 
the first decade of its operation.5 The complementarity regime governing the 
operation of the ICC further underscores the considerable leverage of states in 
 
 3.  On the current state of International Law and International Relations scholarship more 
generally, see INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013). 
 4.  For a recent and important IL perspective that glosses over the significance of social practices 
inside international courts, see, for example, Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International 
Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J.INT’L L. 225 (2013). Suggestive of the neglect in IR is 
GOVERNANCE, ORDER, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN REALPOLITIK AND 
A COSMOPOLITAN COURT (Steven C. Roach ed., 2009), in which analyses of macrodynamics stand in 
for theoretically driven and empirically grounded analyses of the microdynamics of international 
justice. The practice approach is one way of helping to address this unfortunate imbalance in the study 
of the ICC by scholars of IR, where—rather problematically—desk research continues to be seen as an 
adequate substitute for in-depth field research.  
 5.  On role(s) of power in the international system, see, for example, POWER IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). 
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the pursuit of international justice.6 
And yet it would be analytically shortsighted to ignore the inner workings of 
international courts. As the contributors to this issue make clear, what goes on 
inside the ICC is of immediate relevance for making sense of the development 
and outcomes of international adjudication. I suggest that international courts 
such as the ICC can be profitably studied as both bureaucracies with varying 
degrees of autonomy—and occasionally even power—and agents controlled by 
principals, specifically the States Parties.7 Seeing that the latter perspective has 
dominated the study of international courts,8 I make a case for a 
complementary approach, namely one that places the agent in the foreground 
of the analysis, and places the principals directing the agent in the background. 
Once at the center of the analysis, the agency of international courts requires 
careful unpacking. Whether from the vantage point of practice theory9 or 
 
 6.  For a comprehensive analysis, see the two-volume study THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El 
Zeidy eds., 2011).  
 7.  For this argument, made in the context of international organizations more generally, see 
IVER B. NEUMANN & OLE JACOB SENDING, GOVERNING THE POLITY: PRACTICE, MENTALITY, 
RATIONALITY 137 (2010).   
 8.  Exemplary of the principal–agent approach to the study of international courts are Manfred 
Elsig & Mark Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment 
at the World Trade Organization, EUR. J. INT’L REL. (forthcoming), available at http://ejt.sagepub.com/ 
content/early/2012/09/05/1354066112448201; Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the 
European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171 (1995); Geoffrey Garrett, Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The 
European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 
INT’L ORG. 149 (1998); Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification—The Agency 
Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333 (2002); and Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial 
Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669 (2007). A 
collection of applications to international organizations more generally can be found in DELEGATION 
AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. 
Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006). For a discussion and critique of this approach’s dominance, 
see Karen Alter, Agent or Trustees?: International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L 
REL. 33 (2008); and Karen Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding 
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Winter 2008). 
 9.  I use “practice theory” in this article interchangeably with “practice-based reasoning,” 
“practice-based approach,” “practice thinking,” and related terms. Although the term practice theory 
has wide currency in social theory, it is, in many respects, a misnomer because no unified theoretical 
perspective exists—or is even desired by those who have adopted this general approach to studying 
social life—in the social sciences. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that practice theorists are not 
interested in developing theories as conventionally understood in positivist social science, that is, as 
testable propositions that explain classes of events in the pursuit of generalization. Rather, the 
theoretical purview of virtually all practice theorists extends to all kinds of abstract endeavors, whether 
they are short-range, mid-range, or long-range in nature. As one scholar writes,  
A theory is of the practice variety . . . when it either (1) proffers a general and abstract 
account of practices, either the field of practice or some subdomain thereof, or (2) refers 
whatever it offers a general and abstract account of to the field of practices. . . . Systems of 
generalization (or universal statements) that back explanations, predictions, and research 
strategies are theories. But so, too, for example, are typologies of social phenomena; models 
of social affairs; accounts of what social things (e.g., practices, institutions) are; conceptual 
frameworks developed expressly for depicting sociality; and descriptions of social life—so 
long as they are couched in general, abstract terms. 
Theodore R. Schatzki, Introduction: Practice Theory, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY 
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otherwise, the contributors to this issue engage in such an unpacking, 
collectively attempting to disaggregate the first permanent international 
criminal court by scrutinizing various socially meaningful or otherwise 
significant aspects of its everyday life. When considered in conjunction, these 
analytic narratives enable us to paint a more nuanced picture than currently 
exists of one of the most innovative—and contested—international 
organizations ever created. 
Second, and more broadly, I seek to chart a path in-between objectivism 
and subjectivism when it comes to making sense of the practice of international 
law. All too often, accounts of international organizations veer toward one or 
the other of these analytical extremes. As Matthew Eagleton-Pierce rightly 
points out, 
[O]jectivist accounts, such as those produced in the rational actor tradition, often 
project images of agents engaged in purposeful calculation when it may be more 
accurate to define their behaviours as experimental or non-intentional. At the same 
time, purely subjective accounts also have problems, such as often over-emphasising 
the individual as a category of analysis to the expense of groups and structures.
10
 
Likewise the study of the ICC is hampered by an artificial divide between 
IR and IL accounts of the international organization’s operation. More often 
than not, IR accounts are objectivist in the sense just described. Whether 
explicitly or implicitly, the preferences of collective agents (for example, the 
ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor, or judges) are taken as a given (that is, 
exogenous) rather than as the product of institutional dynamics (that is, 
endogenous) and thus not separable from them.11 IL accounts, by contrast, are 
often so preoccupied with the technical minutiae of prosecution and 
adjudication in The Hague that the structured contingency of individual action 
is not noticed, let alone studied.12 
Third, I am hoping to inspire an interpretive turn in the study of practices in 
international law. On the foundation of my own ethnographic work on the ICC, 
 
THEORY 3–4 (Theodore R. Schatzki et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Schatzki, Introduction: Practice 
Theory]. My conception of the nature of “analytic narratives”—the term I choose to classify the 
empirical analyses collected in this issue—is grounded in this understanding of what constitutes 
theoretical work in the social sciences. Consequently, my conception of the term departs rather 
fundamentally from the narrow definition pioneered by Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, 
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast in their coauthored volume ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 
(1998). I will return to this methodological issue in part VI below.    
 10.  Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Examining the Case for Reflexivity in International Relations: 
Insights from Bourdieu, 1 J. CRITICAL GLOBALISATION STUD. 111, 112 (2009). 
 11.  See, e.g., DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A 
WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (forthcoming 2014); STEVEN C. ROACH, POLITICIZING THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE CONVERGENCE OF POLITICS, ETHICS, AND LAW (2006). 
For a very similar approach, though adopted by a lawyer, see BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF 
LAW (2004). 
 12.  See, e.g., CONOR MCCARTHY, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (2012); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (4th ed. 2011); THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: 
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 6.  
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and inspired by Bourdieu’s indefatigable commitment to ground-level empirical 
research on social practices in nonlegal domains, I am keen to alter the ratio of 
field research to desk research in the study of international law, in which both IL 
and IR scholars have arguably been rather too content with observing 
international adjudication from afar, with predictable consequences for the 
depth and subtlety of resultant observations. 
The remainder of the article is organized into six parts. In part II, I consider 
the significance of practice theory for the study of international law. I make a 
case for a practice turn in IL by situating the methodological approach in the 
context of alternative approaches for the analysis of international legal 
phenomena. In part III, I set out the conceptual parameters for the study of 
practices in international law. I introduce key attributes regularly associated 
with practice-based reasoning in the social sciences. I offer an initial, simplifying 
account of what practices are and how they work. With this theoretical baseline 
in place, I advance a working definition of social practices that is usable for the 
study of international law. In part IV, I take a step back and introduce more 
complexity. I present an overview of noteworthy advances in classic and 
contemporary practice theory in order to accomplish two goals: first, to show 
that practice-based reasoning has a long pedigree such that it ultimately 
cannot—and therefore should not—be reduced to one integrated account of 
what practices are and how they work and, second, to showcase the 
considerably diverse intellectual oeuvre that is available for adoption and 
reconfiguration by entrepreneurial IL and IR scholars intrigued to think more 
theoretically about the many visible—and hidden—practices that constitute 
international law. In part V I demonstrate the significance of studying practices, 
as defined in part III, with particular reference to empirical scholarship from IR 
and IL respectively. In a first step, I use the example of the macrophenomenon 
of diplomacy to illustrate the importance of taking the logic of practices as 
seriously as other logics of social action. I then complement the discussion, 
again by way of example, with IL scholarship on the practice of legality (which 
is representative of an international practice) in the international system and on 
the practice of human rights at the World Bank (which is representative of what 
I call an organizational practice). Against the background of this necessarily 
abbreviated reading of the existing literature, I use part VI to advance 
methodological guidelines for the study of practices in international law. With 
specific reference to the broad universe of practices pertaining to the operation 
of the ICC, I delineate concrete strategies of inquiry. I illustrate the utility of 
these methodological guidelines by drawing selectively on the contributions to 
this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. The international legal practices 
that I will discuss encompass both international practices and organizational 
practices, and thus exemplify the application of practice theory at both the 
micro- and macrolevel of social analysis. I conclude in part VII, and consider 
implications for the practice of international law. 
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II 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRACTICES 
The dearth of institutionalist scholarship on the ICC, which I bemoan in this 
article, is not altogether surprising. For neither graduate school nor law school, 
with a few notable exceptions, prepare Ph.D. or J.D. students for what 
international courts are really like.13 In IL, a variant of what social scientists 
would call “old institutionalism” continues to hold sway. Its prevalence vitiates 
against the kind of analytically sophisticated empirical scholarship that is 
lacking in, but that would immeasurably advance, the study of international law, 
and in particular the study of its practice. The vast majority of courses in law 
schools on international criminal law (ICL), to the extent that they are more 
than mere survey classes, are doctrine-driven and jurisprudence-heavy. By and 
large, this is a good thing, because a deep familiarity with the tangible, everyday 
products of international law is a sine qua non of both leading IL scholarship 
and practice—although most IR scholars strain to appreciate this. 
This doctrinal and jurisprudential immersion often comes, however, at the 
expense of a more holistic and more rigorous study of international law, 
especially of ICL. There, little attention has thus far been paid to questions of 
institutional design, institutional development, and institutional effects, that is, 
analytical questions around which a considerable chunk of scholarship in the 
social sciences, and especially in political science, has revolved in the past thirty 
years, whether in the subfields of American politics, comparative politics, or 
IR.14 I put it thus, several years ago, in a review of William Schabas’s important 
yet rather conventional volume on adjudication in ICL, The UN International 
Criminal Tribunals: 
International legal scholarship is ignoring, at it own peril, the significance of 
qualitative research for the study of international criminal courts and tribunals. It is 
crucial to appreciate in this context that the kinds of ideographic reasoning at which 
the social sciences excel are qualitatively different from—and more sophisticated 
than—the descriptive (although often technically compelling) accounts of 
international legal institutions, processes, and outcomes typically produced by 
international lawyers. This is so because international legal scholarship continues to be 
dominated, in the words of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, by an improbable 
combination of doctrinalism and idealism.
15
 
To combat both doctrinalism and idealism, a turn to practice theory may be 
useful. For the vast majority of international legal scholarship is reminiscent of 
the old institutionalism in law and the social sciences. That approach (now 
virtually extinct in the social sciences) consisted primarily of detailed 
 
 13.  The same holds true for countries in which the study of law is an undergraduate degree. 
 14.  For an overview of the breadth and sophistication of this research agenda, see, for example, 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder & Bert 
A. Rockman eds., 2008). 
 15.  Jens Meierhenrich, Book Review, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 696, 699 (2008); see also JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that 
international law matters but that it is considerably less powerful and less significant than the majority 
of scholars and practitioners believe). 
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configurative studies of different institutional (administrative, legal, and 
political) structures. “This work,” according to Kathleen Thelen and Sven 
Steinmo, “was often deeply normative, and the little comparative ‘analysis’ then 
existing largely entailed the juxtaposed descriptions of different institutional 
configurations in different countries, comparing and contrasting. This approach 
did not encourage the development of intermediate-level categories and 
concepts that would facilitate truly comparative research and advance 
explanatory theory.”16 
In the early 1980s, this approach, which grew out of the public-law tradition, 
was beginning to give way to a “new institutionalism,” first in economics 
(pioneered by Nobel Laureate Douglass North), then in sociology and political 
science.17 In contrast to the behavioralism of the 1960s and 1970s, when 
institutions were viewed as epiphenomenal, that is, as not more than the sum of 
individual-level properties, this new institutionalist movement was built around 
a series of interlocking ideas: 
The ideas deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an 
interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions; they 
deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes and efficient histories in favor of 
relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency; they deemphasize metaphors 
of choice and allocative outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality 
of meaning and symbolic action.
18
 
What is the significance of any of this for the study of international criminal 
courts and tribunals? Let me make the connections clear. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), to name but a few, are organizations (just like the U.S. Treasury, firms, 
or rebel movements). Thus, they can be studied as such. The very same 
questions about institutional design, choice, and development that we have 
deemed worthy of investigation in the domestic context (and in the context of 
such supranational organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or the European Union19) can be profitably explored in The Hague, 
 
 16.  Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in 
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (Sven 
Steinmo et al. eds., 1992); see also Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The 
New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 909–10 (1996) 
(evaluating analytical advances of, and similarities between, the sociology of law and the sociology of 
organizations). 
 17.  Overviews of these trends are contained in PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004); MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN 
ECONOMICS: THE OLD AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (1994) and THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).  
 18.  James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984). 
 19.  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIALIZATION IN EUROPE (Jeffrey T. 
Checkel ed., 2007); JOSEPH JUPILLE, PROCEDURAL POLITICS: ISSUES, INFLUENCE, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004); WALLACE J. THIES, WHY NATO 
ENDURES (2009); Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War, 50 INT’L ORG. 445 
(1996). 
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Arusha, and Freetown. The next generation of international legal scholars 
studying international criminal courts and tribunals must “decenter” these 
international organizations—that is, they must analyze the multiple ways in 
which the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, or any other such institution is produced, 
reproduced, and reconfigured as a result of the particular and contingent 
beliefs, preferences, and strategies of the individuals (as well as collectivities) 
acting within them as well as upon them. 
In IR, by contrast, old institutionalism was banished in the early 1980s, 
when it also began to disappear in other subfields of political science as well as 
in the disciplines of economics and sociology. Yet the relative neglect of the 
inner workings of international courts in general and of the ICC in particular is 
surprising nevertheless, especially because IR scholars in other contexts 
successfully disaggregated the bureaucracies of international organizations.20 
These important advances notwithstanding, still largely missing from the 
empirical turn in international legal scholarship are treatments of international 
courts as bureaucracies. More specifically lacking are studies that focus, to 
invoke Karl Llewellyn, on the “law-crafts” of international law.21 The focus on 
everyday practices of the ICC that I promote in this article is one of several 
ways of deepening—and broadening—the empirical turn in international legal 
scholarship. It is noteworthy because it can be used to foreground aspects of 
international law not commonly subjected to analytic scrutiny. I begin this 
article from the premise that a considerable portion of what international 
lawyers and other actors contributing to the making of international criminal 
law do is not the result of conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection. 
Rather, I assume, with Vincent Pouliot, that “practices are the result of 
inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear ‘self-
evident’ or commonsensical. This is the logic of practicality, a fundamental 
feature of social life that is often overlooked by social scientists.”22 
This omission is particularly glaring in the domain of international law. 
Despite a veritable cottage industry of quantitative scholarship on the 
determinants and effects of international law emanating from the social 
sciences, the majority of scholars, most of whom are inexorably embedded in 
the knowledge structures of IR, have shown a considerable disregard for the 
really existing worlds of international law. In addition to the “widespread 
 
 20.  A notable exception is BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (2008), though this treatment is not theoretically motivated or otherwise driven by a 
progressive social ontology. Having said that, it contains numerous interesting observations that 
suggest the author is cognizant of the importance of (also) scaling down in order to make sense of the 
ICC.    
 21.  On the notion of the “social lives” of international justice, see PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Marie-Bénédicte Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., 2007). 
See also Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 999 
(2006) (examining the contributions of anthropological and ethnographic research to understanding the 
development and sources of international law).  
 22.  Vincent Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities, 62 
INT’L ORG. 257, 258 (2008) [hereinafter Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality]. 
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ignorance of legal theory and epistemology among political science and IR 
scholars,” recently diagnosed by Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack,23 most social 
scientists betray a very weak understanding of how international law really 
works. By opening the black box of the ICC, which most IR scholars (and also 
many IL scholars) continue to treat as if it were an undifferentiated whole, the 
contributors to this issue seek to help close the considerable methodological 
gap that still divides the disciplinary approaches of IR and IL scholarship. This 
is more necessary than ever, for, if we believe Dunoff and Pollack, the much-
touted rapprochement between the two disciplinary subfields that Kenneth 
Abbott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others envisaged has not been as 
harmonious as many had hoped it would be when it commenced some twenty 
years ago: 
On the IR side, caricature and ignorance of international legal scholarship is, if 
anything, more widespread. It appears that many political scientists are concerned that 
legal scholarship is overtly normative and fails to generate predictive, testable 
hypotheses; is highly formalistic, overly technical, and inaccessible to those who lack 
legal training; and ignores issues of fundamental interest to IR scholars, such as the 
role of power asymmetries in producing international outcomes.
24
 
Dunoff and Pollack might have added that many IR scholars also hold an 
outdated view of contemporary international law as practice. For in addition to 
regularly downplaying the explanatory significance of IL approaches to the 
study of international law, IR scholars have but a scant understanding of what 
international legal practitioners actually do on a daily basis. Unlike most 
scholars of comparative politics who have an intimate understanding of their 
research sites, IR scholars of international law have tended to stay well clear of 
fieldwork. Analysts who study international legal actors, institutions, 
organizations, and processes on the ground—where things are considerably 
more complex than they appear from a few thousand miles away—are rare. As 
a result, many IR scholars have a very simplistic sense of what makes 
international law hang together. International legal goings-on are regularly 
reduced to factors that can be reflectively isolated. By this I mean that the vast 
majority of IR scholars gloss over explanatory factors that cannot be objectively 
studied.25 
 
 23.  INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 3, at 11. 
 24.  Id. at 13. Among the first calls for interdisciplinary collaboration between international and 
the social sciences (with a particular focus on IR) was Kenneth Abbott’s 1989 article, Modern 
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989). 
For an early symposium on the beginnings of a rapprochement, see THE METHODS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004). The contributions 
previously appeared in the pages of the American Journal of International Law. Symposium on Method 
in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999). 
 25.  For a recent and influential example, see BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). For a foundational collection of articles, see 
also Special Issue, Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT.’L ORG 385, reprinted in LEGALIZATION 
AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter 
eds., 2003).   
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In recent years, Yves Dezalay and a number of largely Europe-based 
scholars from across law and the social sciences have begun to pay theoretical 
attention to the practice of international law.26 Unfortunately, the bulk of this 
scholarship has been centered on the process of legal integration in Europe.27 It 
remains for the general approach of Dezalay and others to make inroads in the 
study of ICL. In this article I make a foray into this unchartered terrain. 
III 
THE LOGIC OF PRACTICES 
“Practice theory”—by which I mean the entire universe of perspectives that 
have sought, since the late 1970s, to incorporate practice-based reasoning into 
social theory, and more recently into legal theory—defies easy articulation. 
Though the term practice theory is widely used, it would be more accurate to 
speak of practice theories, in the plural. For one is hard-pressed to extract from 
the many contending perspectives on the nature and logic of practices easily 
comprehensible tenets that all of the scholars who have contributed to 
theorizing the phenomenon would readily accept, although I will attempt to do 
so nonetheless. I begin by taking a brief look at the intellectual juncture at 
which practice theory—at least in its contemporary variant—emerged, and in 
response to which rival strands of thought. Doing so is useful in order to 
appreciate what is at stake in adopting—or rejecting—a focus on practices in 
international law. 
In the social sciences, theorists like Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and 
Marshall Sahlins, in particular, responded to the intellectual supremacy of what 
Sherry Ortner has usefully described as “theories of ‘constraint.’”28 Most 
influential among these theories of constraint were interpretive (or symbolic) 
anthropology (invented by Clifford Geertz), Marxist political economy 
(advocated by Eric Wolf), and French structuralism (by Claude Lévi-Strauss).29 
Within anthropology in the 1970s, the advocates of these divergent intellectual 
responses to the previously widespread dogma of functionalism all espoused the 
ontological priority of structures over agents. This is to say, they all believed 
that the behavior of individuals and collectivities is ultimately reducible to the 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Yves Dezalay, Les courtiers de l’international: Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de 
l’impérialisme et missionnaires de l’universel, ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
[ARSS], Mar. 2004, at 5 (Fr.) (exploring the ways in which international professional elites—experts, 
consultants, and so on—have invented, promoted, engineered, and otherwise shaped various facets of 
globalization); Guillaume Sacriste & Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International Law: Lawyers’ 
Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 83 (2007) (tracing the 
multiple and often antagonistic roles of international lawyers in the interwar years).  
 27.  Representative publications are EUROPEAN WAYS OF LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN 
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Volkmar Gessner & David Nelken eds., 2007); LAWYERING EUROPE: 
EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD (Antoine Vauchez & Bruno de Witte eds., 
2013).  
 28.  Sherry B. Ortner, Updating Practice Theory, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: 
CULTURE, POWER, AND THE ACTING SUBJECT 1, 1 (Sherry B. Ortner ed., 2006). 
 29.  Id. 
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manifold social structures—from kinship to families to bureaucracies to beliefs 
to world systems—in which agents are embedded. Ortner puts it thus: 
Human behavior was shaped, molded, ordered, and defined by external social and 
cultural forces and formations: by culture, by mental structures, by capitalism. . . . But 
a purely constraint-based theory, without attention to either human agency or to the 
processes that produce and reproduce those constraints—social practices—was 
coming to seem increasingly problematic.
30
 
In sociology, Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, and others, drawing on 
ideas of Max Weber, George Mead, and Herbert Blumer, introduced what 
became known as “symbolic interactionism” and (subsequently) 
“ethnomethodology” into the debate in order to counter what they considered 
the excessive influence of structuralism in social theory.31 Putting agents front 
and center, the advocates of these relatively marginal approaches were 
preoccupied with the microdynamics of social interaction. By erring on the side 
of agents, these advocates often let structures fall entirely by the wayside. The 
result was a methodological individualism that was as inadequate in capturing 
social complexity as the methodological structuralism that symbolic 
interactionism had sought to replace.32 It is this intellectual logjam that practice 
theorists (as they later came to be known) set out to break.33 
Although there is considerable variation among practice-based theories, 
what unites all practice theorists, self-declared and otherwise, are two important 
intellectual commitments, as perceptively identified by David Stern: first, a 
commitment to “holism about meaning” and, second, an “emphasis on the 
importance of close attention to particular practices and the context within 
which they are located.”34 At the inception of practice theory, three particular 
works were marshaled in support of the discipline’s twin commitments. 
Together the works encapsulated much of practice-based theorizing in the 
1970s. Two of them were sociological, the third anthropological, in disciplinary 
orientation. Arguably the most important was Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory 
of Practice, followed by Giddens’s Central Problems of Social Theory and 
Sahlins’s Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities.35 Each in its own way, 
these works 
set out to conceptualize the articulations between the practices of social actors ‘on the 
ground’ and the big ‘structures’ and ‘systems’ that both constrain those practices and 
yet are ultimately susceptible to being transformed by them. They accomplished this 
 
 30.  Id. at 1–2. 
 31.  Id. at 2. 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  David G. Stern, The Practical Turn, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 185 (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003). 
 35.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, 
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE]; ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL 
THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979); MARSHALL 
SAHLINS, HISTORICAL METAPHORS AND MYTHICAL REALITIES: STRUCTURE IN THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF THE SANDWICH ISLANDS KINGDOM (1981). For a brief discussion of the first two books 
and their relation to practice theory, see infra Parts IV.B.4, IV.C.1. 
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by arguing, in different ways, for the dialectical, rather than oppositional relationship 
between the structural constraints of society and culture on the one hand and the 
‘practices’—the new term was important—of social actors on the other. They argued 
as well that ‘objectivist’ perspectives (like Wolf’s political economy) and ‘subjectivist’ 
perspectives (like Geertz’s interpretive anthropology) were not opposed ways of doing 
social science but represented ‘moments’ in a larger project of attempting to 
understand the dialectics of social life.
36
 
By offering a promising way to transcend the so-called agent–structure problem 
in social theory—that is, the long-standing, unresolved question of whether 
agents or structures are ontologically prior when it comes to explaining the 
social world around us—Bourdieu, Giddens, Sahlins, and the practice-oriented 
scholarship they inspired “restored the actor to the social process without losing 
sight of the larger structures that constrain (but also enable) social action.”37 
Against this background, it is no wonder that practice theory is gradually 
finding adherents among IR and (though more rarely) IL scholars. Largely 
inspired by Alexander Wendt’s seminal 1987 article on the agent–structure 
problem in the study of international politics,38 IR theorists in the 1990s spilled 
much ink on questions of epistemology and ontology and the relation of each to 
explanation and understanding in their field of study.39 Because empirical 
scholarship on questions related to the constitution (to borrow Giddens’s term) 
of international phenomena is now more common (and sophisticated) than 
twenty years ago, the grounded approach first advocated by practice theorists 
for making sense of domestic goings-on is increasingly being adapted for the 
study of the international system. In IR, this tendency is illustrated, most 
recently, by work on so-called international practices such as diplomacy and 
deterrence.40 The introduction of practice theory into IL can be traced back to 
Yves Dezalay, whose work on international commercial arbitration and related 
international phenomena, often undertaken in collaboration with Bryant Garth, 
has, for the last twenty years, endeavored to inspire a similar “practice turn” in 
the study of foreign, comparative, and international law.41 More recently, 
 
 36.  Ortner, supra note 28, at 2 (internal citation omitted). 
 37.  Id. at 3. 
 38.  Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, 41 INT’L. 
ORG. 335 (1987). 
 39.  For an influential collection, see INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND (Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski eds., 1996). See also MARTIN HOLLIS & STEVE SMITH, 
EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1991). For the most sophisticated 
and coherent restatement of conventional IR theory at the time, see ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999). 
 40.  For more detailed accounts of these studies and other IR scholarship employing the tools of 
practice theory, see infra Part V. For an overview, see INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES (Emanuel Adler & 
Vincent Pouliot eds., 2011). 
 41.  Representative of their practice-oriented scholarship are their three award-winning books, 
namely YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW 
OF EMPIRE (2010); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION A N D  T H E  C O N S T RU C T I O N  O F  A  T R A N S NAT I O NA L  L E G A L  
O R D E R  (1996)  [here inafter  D E Z A L A Y  &  G A R T H,  D E A L I N G  I N  V I R T U E ] ; YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, 
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002). 
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Antoine Vauchez and others have taken up the Bourdieusian mantle and 
contributed to spreading practice-based scholarship on international legal 
phenomena, with particular reference to the legal integration of the European 
Union and related developments.42 Entirely missing from this fledgling IL trend, 
however, is the study of ICL, where practice theory has made no discernable 
inroads. But before I turn to ICL, I will elaborate on the essentials of practice 
theory and then reconstruct its genealogy—all for the purpose of providing the 
intellectual building blocks for the sophisticated, and diverse, study of practices 
in international law. 
A. What Are Practices? 
The nature of practices, like that of most categories of analysis, is contested. 
Alternative conceptions abound. Notwithstanding this richness in conceptual 
imagination, the essence of practices is stable across the multitude of existing 
definitions as almost all conceptions of practices, and the theories constructed 
around them, 
foreground the importance of activity, performance, and work in the creation and 
perpetuation of all aspects of social life. Practice approaches are fundamentally 
processual and tend to see the world as an ongoing routinized and recurrent 
accomplishment. This applies even to the most durable aspect of social life—what 
scholars call social structures. Family, authority, institutions, and organizations are all 
kept in existence through the recurrent performance of material activities, and to a 
large extent they only exist as long as those activities are performed.
43
 
But what exactly are practices? Consider the following four contending 
conceptions from the late twentieth century: Michael Oakeshott’s procedural 
conception, Alasdair MacIntyre’s cultural conception, Theodore Schatzki’s 
agentic conception, and Pierre Bourdieu’s “sobjectivist” conception. Although 
in the present analysis I very deliberately simplify the nature of practices, in 
part IV I take a step back and, also very deliberately, introduce uncertainty into 
the discussion. Hopefully, this additional layer of complexity will be useful 
when I eventually turn, in part VI, to contemplating methodological guidelines 
for the study of practices in international law. The variety of theoretical 
approaches will serve, in part IV and also in the immediate analysis, as a useful 
reminder that there is more than one way of defining—and thus of studying—
the practice of international law. 
To begin with, the philosopher Michael Oakeshott as part of advancing his 
theory of action referred to a practice as 
a set of considerations, manners, uses, observances, customs, standards, canons, 
maxims, principles, rules, and offices specifying useful procedures or denoting 
obligations or duties which relate to human actions and utterances. It is a prudential 
or an authoritative adverbial qualification of choices and performances, more or less 
 
 42.  For an overview of this decidedly Europe-oriented research agenda, see Antoine Vauchez, 
Introduction: Euro-Lawyering, Transnational Social Fields and European Polity-Building, in 
LAWYERING EUROPE, supra note 27.  
 43.  DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK, AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 3 
(2013). 
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complicated, in which conduct is understood in terms of a procedure.
44
 
As compelling—and recognizable from our everyday lives—as this definition of 
a singular practice is, it falls shorts in key respects. Most important, because it is 
excessively steeped in methodological individualism, Oakeshott’s take on 
practice glosses over the feedback loop—that is, the mutually constitutive 
relationship—that usually exists between agents and the structures surrounding 
them.45 Notably, he does so by conceptually separating practices from the 
actions they are said to govern. As one critic has it, 
Oakeshott sunders them because, as a good conservative, he wants the identity of 
action to derive solely from features of individuals. This he achieves by tethering what 
someone does to his or her understandings and motives. Once, however, the identity 
of action is pegged to the individual, practices (i.e., sociality) can only pertain to the 
how of action.
46
 
One remedy adopted by practice theorists has been to make sociality a 
defining attribute of practice. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre, also arguing 
from philosophy, defines practices as 
coherent and complex form[s] of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended.
47
 
Unpacking this abstract definition, one is left with three defining attributes that 
a form of activity must possess in order to justify calling it a practice on this 
account: It must be complex, it has to have internal goods, and it has to be 
enacted in the pursuit of standards of certain societal values, such as excellence. 
In this same analysis, MacIntyre gives a series of real-world examples to 
illustrate his definition: 
Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with 
skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; 
architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the enquiries of 
physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting 
and music.
48
 
The definitional requirement of “internal goods” is best illustrated by reference 
to one of MacIntyre’s preferred examples: the practice of chess. Internal goods 
 
 44.  MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 55 (1975). 
 45.  The classical statement remains ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: 
OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1986) [hereinafter GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
SOCIETY] (critiquing orthodox social science and calling for a combination of insights from 
functionalism and naturalism). For a recent exploration in the context of international politics, see 
COLIN WIGHT, AGENTS, STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POLITICS AS ONTOLOGY 
(2006) (arguing that epistemological and methodological differences in the study of international 
politics are insignificant and that the only differences worth investigating are ontological, that is, they 
relate to our understanding of how the world is constituted).  
 46.  THEODORE R. SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TO HUMAN 
ACTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL 97 (1996) [hereinafter SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES]. 
 47.  ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187 (1981).  
 48.  Id. 
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are the (more or less) unique products derived from the act of playing chess, for 
example, the attainment of particular analytical skills or the ability to reason 
strategically, as illustrated by the ability to predict an opponent’s moves. 
External goods are products that the practice of chess may well help produce—
money, power, fame—but that are not uniquely related to the activity.49 
For MacIntyre, practices are fairly stable, long-lasting phenomena related to 
what he calls “living tradition.” As he writes, 
[T]he history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded in 
and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition through 
which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us; the history of each of our 
own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in 
terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions.
50
 
MacIntyre, unlike other theorists who have attempted to capture and define the 
nature of practices in our lives, has a rather optimistic outlook. In his moral 
philosophy, being part of a tradition (and, by implication, its practices) is an 
important ingredient of the good life. As a consequence, practices, for 
MacIntyre, tend to be marked by coherence and cooperation. This is an 
assumption not shared by all practice theorists—a difference that manifests 
itself conceptually. Take, for example, the definition of practice by Theodore 
Schatzki, to which I now turn. 
For Schatzki, a practice refers to “a temporally evolving, open-ended set of 
doings and sayings” constituted and maintained by “practical understandings, 
rules, teleoaffective structures, and general understandings.”51 This definition 
offers an analytical, rather than normative, take on practices. What is more, 
unlike his predecessors, Schatzki, by way of the definitional qualifier “open-
ended,” emphasizes that practices “entail irregularities and unexpected 
elements.”52 It follows from this that practices, thus understood, are not an 
inherently desirable logic of social action, as the definitional accounts of 
Oakeshott and MacIntyre would have us believe. Whether discrete actions 
combine to a unified practice in Schatzki’s account is determined solely by the 
presence or absence of four mechanisms—“practical understandings, rules, 
teleoaffective structures, and general understandings.”53 The worthiness or 
meaningfulness or effectiveness of practices is an entirely separate, empirical 
question. 
Schatzki has made a valuable contribution to specifying the nature of 
practices by suggesting that the nexus between doings and sayings is brought 
about and shaped by the interplay among understandings, procedures, and 
engagements that vary independently from one another depending on context, 
 
 49.  Id. at 187. 
 50.  Id. at 222.  
 51.  THEODORE R. SCHATZKI, THE SITE OF THE SOCIAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL LIFE AND CHANGE 87 (2002) [hereinafter SCHATZKI, THE SITE OF THE 
SOCIAL]. 
 52.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 164. 
 53.  Id. at 165. 
1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:29 AM 
16 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:1 
and that determine the kinds of performances that some theorists say are part 
and parcel of all forms of “praxis,” by which is meant the world of human action 
(in contrast to the world of human reflection). One implication of Schatzki’s 
concretization of the nature of practices is that, on his conception, “practices 
can easily overlap and the same doing can be part of two practices.”54 This is of 
immediate relevance for understanding the practice of international law 
because it opens up an analytical space in which multiple interpretations of the 
social meaning of legal behavior can coexist. Methodologically, this means that 
a practitioner’s interpretation of “doing” in an applied international legal 
setting—such as the ICC—could be entirely compatible with an analyst’s 
conflicting interpretation of the same “doing.” For example, an explanatory 
account that holds a particular adjudicative way of doing things to be 
representative of a bureaucratic practice could be as valid as—and entirely 
compatible with—an alternative account that points to the same conduct as 
constituting a stigmatizing practice.55 It is precisely in this sense, as Davide 
Nicolini points out, that “authors operating within this tradition [of practice-
based reasoning] insist that practices are not just what people do, and that 
adopting a practice approach is distinctly different from simply providing more 
accurate, or more detailed or ‘thicker’ descriptions of people’s conduct.”56 To 
push this agenda, Schatzki distinguishes between “integrative practices” and 
“dispersed practices.” Because the former are easier to understand, let me start 
with them. 
Schatzki defines integrative practices as “the more complex practices found 
in and constitutive of particular domains of social life. Examples are farming 
practices, business practices, voting practices, teaching practices, celebration 
practices, cooking practices, recreational practices, industrial practices, religious 
practices, and banking practices.”57 For the province of social life with which I 
am concerned in this article, an example of what Schatzki understands by an 
integrative practice is the totality of legal practices in domestic politics and 
international affairs. Dispersed practices, on the other hand, refer to “a set of 
doings and sayings linked primarily by an understanding they express,” 
according to Schatzki, who further notes that “[e]xamples of dispersed practices 
are the practices of describing, ordering, following rules, explaining, 
questioning, reporting, examining, and imagining.”58 Without going into 
technical detail, what Schatzki’s very demanding treatment of the 
conceptualization of practices affords us is an analytical toolkit with which to 
begin to dissect the social lives of international law. Regardless of whether we 
subscribe to his particular theoretical perspective, Schatzki’s definitional efforts 
 
 54.  Id. at 168. 
 55.  An article on adjudicative practices that was scheduled to appear in this issue was not received 
in time for publication. On stigmatizing practices, see Frédéric Mégret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 287. 
 56.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 168. 
 57.  SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 98. 
 58.  Id. at 91. 
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promise to help with demarcating the boundaries of practices that are integral 
to the making of international law. 
A final author to introduce in this discussion of definitions is Bourdieu, 
whose practice theory did not convince Schatzki. Schatzki faulted the French 
sociologist for an excessively structural account centered on the concept of 
“habitus,” a concept that I specify in part IV when I engage in more detail with 
Bourdieu’s influential perspective on the nature and meaning of social 
practices. Yet Bourdieu is important to briefly introduce here because his 
conception of what practices are has featured so prominently in recent IR 
theory.59 Pouliot not long ago came up with the awkward—yet apt—notion of 
“sobjectivism” to convey the ontological position taken up by Bourdieu across 
most of his oeuvre.60 According to this position, both subjectivism and 
objectivism are required for making sense of social life.61 Indeed Bourdieu 
deemed them “equally indispensable to a science of the social world that cannot 
be reduced either to a social phenomenology or to a social physics.”62 It is for 
this reason that, in this preliminary definitional analysis, I speak of Bourdieu’s 
as a sobjective conception of practices. What does this conception entail? 
Sidestepping for now the dense theoretical substance of Bourdieu’s 
treatment, it is worth noting that the French sociologist devoted inordinate 
amounts of space to explicating and fine-tuning his concept of habitus, but 
neglected almost entirely the careful conceptualization of practices, even 
though they feature centrally in several of his most important books. Despite 
this conspicuous gap in Bourdieu’s scholarship, we can deduce a definition from 
his many more general statements, and from some of his empirical work on the 
topic. At one point, Bourdieu speaks of behavior that is “[o]bjectively 
‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to 
rules” and that is “collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
organizing action of a conductor.”63 In Bourdieu’s language, practices are 
sometimes referred to, not much more helpfully, as activities or “games” that 
are played in the context of particular “domains of practice,” which he calls 
“fields.”64 
Alan Warde has remarked that Bourdieu “does not conceive of a practice as 
a coherent entity and is especially intent on emphasizing the importance of 
praxis.”65 Linked to this was a strong concern with corporeality, or the bodily 
 
 59.  For an extended discussion of the Bourdieusian variant of practice theory, see Part V.C.1 
below. 
 60.  Vincent Pouliot, “Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 359, 
359 (2007).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 25 (1990) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC 
OF PRACTICE]. 
 63.  Id. at 53. 
 64.  See infra text accompanying notes 174–177. 
 65.  Alan Warde, Consumption and Theories of Practice, 5 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 131, 133 
(2005). 
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dimensions of practices. This focus, influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception,66 is more pronounced in Bourdieu’s practice 
theory than in some of the others in existence. Yet Bourdieu was less concerned 
with capturing the essence of practices definitionally. Arguably, this was owed 
to his penchant for inductive reasoning, notably his extensive ethnographic 
work.67 It stands to reason that he did not want to exclude ex ante from his 
purview human conduct that may not stand up to a well-crafted definition of 
practices. Bourdieu may also have been reluctant to advance such a definition 
because of his—rather paradoxical in light of his theoretical ambition—
skepticism toward all efforts at explaining and understanding social practices. 
As he wrote in The Logic of Practice, “[T]he language of overall resemblance 
and uncertain abstraction is . . . too intellectualist to be able to express a logic 
that is performed directly in bodily gymnastics, without passing through explicit 
apprehension of the ‘aspects’ chosen or rejected.”68 He went on to contemplate 
the nature of real-world practices (and the related category of rites), pointing to 
the fallacy of seeking to contain in concepts a logic that is made to do without 
concepts; of treating practical manipulations and bodily movements as logical 
operations; of speaking of analogies and homologies (as one has to in order to 
understand and explain) when it is simply a matter of practical transfers of 
incorporated, quasi-postural schemes.
69
 
What remains is a conception of practice that, though underspecified, opens up 
a broader space for empirical exploration than some of the contending 
definitions. By highlighting the importance of habitus, and the significance of 
corporeal schemas, Bourdieu’s sobjective conception draws our attention to yet 
another way of talking about social practices. 
What practices are taken to be varies across the numerous theorists who 
have discovered them and across the various theories that have been 
constructed around them. In this part, I illustrated this theoretical variety and 
the considerable difficulty associated with capturing the nature of practices. 
This conceptual challenge, however, should not cause us to dismiss the 
analytical significance of practices, or to equate practices with mere behavior, as 
some critics are wont to do. As Andreas Reckwitz writes, “There is a certain 
danger of trivializing practice theory. At first sight, its approach might seem 
relatively close to everyday talking about ‘agents’ and their behaviour. In fact, 
 
 66.  See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (1962) (critiquing the 
objective thought of Descartes and Kant and arguing, against the “phenomenological reduction” of 
Husserl and others, that the body, rather than consciousness, is the most important determinant of 
human perception). 
 67.  Aside from southwestern France, Bourdieu’s ethnographic work centered on the Kabyle 
region of Algeria. For an account of his motivations, aims, and circumstances for doing fieldwork in 
that country, see Pierre Bourdieu, Algerian Landing, 5 ETHNOGRAPHY 415 (2004). More recently, see 
also PIERRE BOURDIEU, ALGERIAN SKETCHES (2013). For a critical engagement with Bourideu’s 
ethnographic work in Algeria, see Jane E. Goodman, The Proverbial Bourdieu: Habitus and the Politics 
of Representation in the Ethnography of Kabylia, 105 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 782 (2003).  
 68.  BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 89. 
 69.  Id. at 92. 
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this is not the case.”70 Simply put, practices are “body/knowledge/things-
complexes.”71 What all definitions of practices have in common is the 
conceptual foregrounding of “non-instrumentalist notions of conduct,” as 
Warde helpfully puts it.72 
Although theorists who take practices seriously deny that individuals have 
active agency, by which I mean the capacity to fully determine their own 
behavior, these theorists do not believe in holism either. “As carriers of a 
practice,” Reckwitz notes, individuals 
are neither autonomous [as rationalists assume] nor the judgmental dopes who 
conform to norms [as constructivists tend to argue]: They understand the world and 
themselves, and use know-how and motivational knowledge, according to the 
particular practice [under investigation]. There is a very precise place for the 
“individual”—as distinguished from the agent—in practice theory.
73
 
Because, according to Reckwitz, “there are diverse social practices, and as 
every agent carries out a multitude of different social practices, the individual is 
the unique crossing point of practices, of bodily–mental routines.”74 What this 
means is that practice theory retains the idea of agents (unlike, say, textualism 
or mentalism), but significantly complexifies this idea, thereby overcoming one 
of the major shortcomings associated with methodological individualism, 
namely its crude, automaton-like characterization of really existing individuals. 
The preceding discussion juxtaposed a number of the more prominent 
conceptions of practices currently available. This conceptual variation 
notwithstanding, it is possible to tease out commonalities. On the foundation of 
my preliminary concept analysis, I take practices to refer to recurrent and 
meaningful work activities—social or material—that are performed in a 
regularized fashion and which have a bearing, whether large or small, on a social 
phenomenon, in our case, on the operation of international law. I suggest that 
practices, thus defined, result from the noninstrumental and often spontaneous 
interplay of doing, saying, and knowing by groups of individuals. Implicit in my 
definition and qualifier is the assumption that “practices are inherently 
contingent, materially mediated, and that practice cannot be understood 
without reference to a specific time, place, and concrete historical context.”75 
Reckwitz offers further elaboration: 
A ‘practice’ (Praktik) is a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several 
elements, interconnected to one [an]other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of 
understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge. A 
practice—a way of cooking, of consuming, of working, of investigating, of taking care 
 
 70.  Andreas Reckwitz, Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist 
Theorizing, 5 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 243, 250 (2002). 
 71.  Id. at 258. 
 72.  Warde, supra note 65, at 136. 
 73.  Reckwitz, supra note 70, at 256. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Davide Nicolini, Zooming In and Out: Studying Practices by Switching Theoretical Lenses and 
Trailing Connections, 30 ORG. STUD. 1391, 1394 (2009). 
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of oneself or of others, etc.—forms so to speak a ‘block’ whose existence necessarily 
depends on the existence and specific interconnectedness of these elements, and which 
cannot be reduced to any one of these single elements.
76
 
For Reckwitz, studying practices means identifying and interpreting the many 
ways “in which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated, 
things are described and the world is understood.”77 After all, all of these forms 
of behavior combine to make up what most practice theorists understand by 
practices. 
B. How Do Practices Work? 
In the most general sense, practices are “meaning-making, identity-forming, 
and order-producing.”78 Because this tripartite distinction captures the logic of 
the vast majority of practice-based approaches to social explanation, I adopt it 
here to organize this preliminary sketch. I will illustrate its analytical value with 
passing reference to international law. 
Practices are meaning-making in the sense that they generate and 
disseminate knowledge about the social world. By participating in a practice, 
individuals become acquainted, for better or worse, with a recurrent pattern of 
socially recognized behavior. Such participation can bestow purpose on an 
otherwise mundane everyday activity. In the case of international law, the 
contribution of an individual to a given practice such as the investigation of 
international crimes can go a long way toward validating that individual’s 
choice of vocation especially when practices reference the discourses, 
representations, and other “symbol systems” that are meaningful in the life of 
the individual in question. This is so, as Wilhelm Dilthey, the influential 
historian and philosopher observed, because “the parts of a life have a meaning 
according to their relation to that life, its values and purposes, and according to 
the place they occupy in it.”79 
But practices in international law are meaning-making in a second sense as 
well, as Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth have shown in the case of 
international commercial arbitration: 
Lawyers (assuming that the term even has the same meaning in different countries) 
come from very different national legal traditions and from different parts of the 
profession (judiciary, academy, [private] practice, government), and they respond to 
different clients and constituencies. . . . The abstraction of international law is 
therefore closely tied to the activities of individuals and groups, who thereby give 
concrete meaning to the abstraction.
80
 
This means that individuals engaged in recurrent performances of a legally 
relevant practice—such as international commercial arbitration—invariably 
 
 76.  Reckwitz, supra note 70, at 249–50 (emphasis added). 
 77.  Id. at 250. 
 78.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 7. 
 79.  WILHELM DILTHEY, MEANING IN HISTORY: WILHELM DILTHEY’S THOUGHTS ON HISTORY 
AND SOCIETY 148 (1961). 
 80.  DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 41, at 3. 
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also give meaning to said practice due to the interests, preferences, norms, and 
values that they embody and with which, consciously or otherwise, they infuse 
the activities that constitute the practice. Or, as Bourdieu put it in a foreword to 
Dezalay’s and Garth’s important study, 
The national members of this new international elite, a noblesse de robe, by exercising 
their talents in the major transnational entities, humanitarian organizations, or even 
great legal multinationals, help to bring juridical forms to a higher level of 
universalization in and by a confrontation of different and at times opposed visions.
81
 
The work of Dezalay and Garth is useful for our purposes because it 
powerfully illustrates the utility of reasoning in terms of a logic of practices. 
Without delving too deeply into the substance of their rich and nuanced 
analysis, we learn a considerable deal about the nature and determinants of 
international commercial arbitration because of their focus on “the people who 
are recognized as having authority to handle these high-stakes, complicated 
disputes,” and the multiple conflicts among them.82 Dezalay and Garth, for 
example, find that the kind of international justice that is meted out in the 
context of competition for transnational business disputes is, in key respects, a 
function of social cleavages that exist within the field of international 
commercial arbitration. It appears that the path of socialization that arbitrators 
take on their way into the profession, and the kind of legal setting from which 
they end up operating, have a considerable effect on the type of arbitration that 
they pursue as well as the kind of outcome that we can expect from their 
involvement.83 
One major battle line, say Dezalay and Garth, revolves around what they 
call “grand old men” and “technocrats.” In the civil-law tradition of continental 
Europe, the former cast of arbitrators is comprised of eminent professors and 
high-ranking judges, in the Anglo-American common-law world by senior 
barristers, Queen’s Counsel, and senior partners in U.S.-style law firms.84 The 
technocratic set, by contrast, is less exclusive and more sizable, not to mention 
younger. Its emphasis is not on charisma but on technical competence, notably 
in the economic analysis of law, as increasingly favored by large international 
law firms.85 The emergence of this vocational cleavage about the conduct of 
arbitration is not only interesting, it began to complicate the settlement of 
business disputes by way of international arbitration. That is at least what 
Dezalay and Garth found.86 But other cleavages mattered as well, they noticed. 
There was the divide between “academics” and “practitioners.”87 And in a case 
study of the International Chamber of Commerce of Paris, for example, 
Dezalay and Garth point out additional cleavages that, on their argument, have 
 
 81.  Id. at viii. 
 82.  Id. at 29. 
 83.  Id. at 33–57. 
 84.  Id. at 35–36. 
 85.  Id. at 36–38. 
 86.  Id. at 38. 
 87.  Id. at 41–42. 
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a more than random structuring effect on arbitration outcomes, namely the 
difference between those who continue to see arbitration as a mode of guided 
settlement (of “auxiliary justice”) and those who have come to see it as just 
another form of litigation.88 Dezalay and Garth trace the emergence of these 
contending practices of international commercial arbitration to the mergers and 
acquisitions of enterprises on the one hand, and to increased anti-trust litigation 
on the other. Both trends, they claim, created a demand for a new kind of legal 
knowledge, “that of specialist in taking charge of conflict situations.”89 If we 
believe Dezalay and Garth, in the administration of disputes, these specialists 
“consider judicial recourse not as an end in itself but only as an argument and a 
means of pressure. The negotiators consider judicial recourse as one of the 
weapons that can be deployed in a conflict that will almost surely end prior to 
trial.”90 Dezalay and Garth use this example of the rationalization of arbitration 
practices in international law, in conjunction with many others, to account for 
the gradual decline of the lex mercatoria, that is, the general principles of 
international commerce, as the principal structuring device of international 
commercial arbitration.91 
Although the empirical veracity of this conclusion need not concern us here, 
it is immediately apparent that the aforementioned findings, and others like it, 
were possible only because Dezalay and Garth, drawing on Bourdieu, decided 
to take seriously the everyday life of international arbitrators, that is, the 
practice of international law. Unlike so many other legal scholars of 
international arbitration, they did not assume that practitioners of the law of 
dispute settlement were identical to one another or were defining and acting on 
the same self-interests in similar ways, and thus not worthy of theoretical or 
empirical explication. Instead, they argued, and showed, that it was important 
to study arbitrators in context, as structurally mediated individuals. The term is 
mine, not theirs, but it serves to relate their take on international commercial 
arbitration to the sobjectivist ontology that is germane, as we have seen, to all 
theories of practice. 
Whatever one makes of the practical significance of Dezalay and Garth’s 
findings in the study of international commercial arbitration, it is undeniable 
that their methodological approach generated insights that neither the 
discipline of IL, nor the profession of international arbitrators, previously 
possessed, at least not at the level of systematicity evidenced by Dealing in 
Virtue. 
By homing in, for the first time, on locally situated examples of legal 
contention over the form and function of international dispute settlement, they 
were able to substantiate a professional shift in the late twentieth century 
“toward more procedurally elaborate and factually based approaches” in the 
 
 88.  Id. at 54–57. 
 89.  Id. at 56. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 39. 
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conduct of international commercial arbitration, thereby providing “a 
convincing account of the internal dynamics of this hitherto virtually 
inaccessible world.”92 Having said that, inasmuch as Dezalay and Garth’s work 
on international commercial arbitration, and more specifically the peculiar 
social world of arbitrators that they describe in such rich detail, shows the value 
of a practice-oriented approach to international law, a closer, more 
ethnographic, exploration of the international legal practices to which they 
alerted us, would substantially complement their pioneering approach and 
further deepen IL’s understanding of the nature and determinants of the 
international arbitration of business disputes. For as one reviewer of the book 
observed, admiringly, “This is an unusual and intriguing book . . . because its 
authors have embarked upon a study based principally upon the development 
of international commercial arbitration and the practice and practitioners of 
arbitration without the benefit of any extensive empirical experience of their 
own upon which to draw.”93 One can only imagine the kind of fine-grained 
contribution about the practices of international commercial arbitration that an 
ethnographic immersion might produce. 
It is the task of the practice-oriented researcher to unearth all of the 
aforementioned aspects of meaning-making, successful and otherwise. Or, to 
paraphrase the historian R. G. Collingwood, the object to be discovered in the 
study of practices is not the mere activity, but the thought expressed in it. To 
discover that thought is already to understand a practice’s meaning.94 
Next, practices are identity-forming in the sense that they regularly shape 
the self-understandings—in whatever direction—of individuals who are 
engaged in their performance. To return to the example of the international 
criminal lawyer, continued exposure to, and participation in, the practices of 
international prosecution or international adjudication may result in a moral 
identification with the project of international justice (or, alternatively, a 
rejection thereof). Importantly, this self-identification can work at both the 
individual and collective levels. Familiarity with bureaucratic practices at, say, 
the ICC, may foster individual socialization on the part of lawyers and other 
practitioners. It may lead to an increased (or decreased) identification with the 
values commonly associated with the permanent international court. As David 
Koller points out, for example, “At its most ambitious, faith in international 
criminal law manifests a hope for a new political reality—both in terms of the 
decisions made by policymakers and in terms of an underlying globally shared 
cosmopolitan identity.”95 The sustained participation in ICC practices can 
 
 92.  Ruth Buchanan, Constructing Virtual Justice in the Global Arena, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 363, 
364 (1997) (reviewing DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 41). 
 93.  John Beechey, Book Review, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 569, 569 (1997).  
 94.  In the original formulation, “[T]he object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the 
thought expressed in it. To discover that thought is already to understand it.” R. G. COLLINGWOOD, 
THE IDEA OF HISTORY 214 (1961).  
 95.  David S. Koller, The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1019, 1023 (2008). 
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strengthen—or weaken—this faith, with predictable effects for individual 
identity formation. But sustained exposure to an international legal way of 
doing things can also set in motion collective identity formation among states.96 
Alastair Iain Johnston explored the logic of international socialization in a 
least likely case, that of China.97 He found that increasing social interactions in 
international security institutions by Beijing’s diplomats in the post-Mao era led 
to their becoming more cooperative and willing to self-bind in treaty 
negotiations over arms control and disarmament.98 Put differently, the 
routinization of legalism (and the practices concretely associated with it) can 
leave a mark on a state’s collective identity. I have elsewhere explored the 
identity-forming consequences of practices of legality in a domestic context.99 
On the international stage, postwar Germany’s expanding commitment to 
international law, which culminated in that country’s important role in the 
negotiations over the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
exemplifies, one could say, the identity-forming consequences of practices of 
legality in an international context. 
Of course, the identity-forming consequences of legal practices will not 
always be inclusive. As several critical IL scholars have shown in the last 
decade, international legal practices also give rise to exclusionary identities.100 
Consider the principle of extraterritoriality, which formed a pervasive 
international practice in the expansion of international society in the nineteenth 
century. The classification of countries like China and Japan, to name but two, 
as culturally inferior at the time has had long-run consequences for identity 
formation in the developing world, leading to what Rogers Brubaker and 
Frederick Cooper termed “external identification,” that is, “formalized, 
codified, objectified systems of categorization developed by powerful, 
authoritative institutions.”101 External identification courtesy of the practice of 
extraterritoriality and other imperialist legal practices provoked in some parts 
of the developing world a century later what Balakrishnan Rajagopal has 
described as “international law from below,” marshaled by agents who defined 
themselves in opposition to the prevailing international legal order, and who 
derived a part of their collective identities from nineteenth- and twentieth-
 
 96.  See generally Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384 (1994) (arguing that the interaction among states in the international system 
can change their identities and interests, which means that both are endogenously derived, not 
exogenously given, as contending theories of IR assume). 
 97.  ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 
1980–2000 (2007). 
 98.  See generally id. 
 99.  JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 1652–2000 (2008). 
 100.  Foundational texts include ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS (Anne Orford 
ed., 2006); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003). 
 101.  Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 1, 15 (2000). 
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century practices of international law.102 
Finally, practices are order-producing. Unlike theoretical accounts of order 
founded on a commitment to methodological individualism, practice-based 
accounts insist that social order is the result of more than the mere interaction 
of self-interested agents. 
Practice thinkers usually acknowledge the structuring and coordinating import of 
agreements, negotiations, and other interactions, as well as the undergirding 
significance of skills and interpretations. They treat these phenomena, however, as 
features of or as embedded in practices, hence as subject to or as constitutive of the 
latter. As a result, interactions, skills, and interpretations determine orders (and are 
themselves ordered) qua features of practice. Practice approaches also tend to reduce 
the scope and ordering power of reason. They do this by abandoning the traditional 
conception of reason as an innate mental faculty and by reconceptualizing it as a 
practice phenomenon.
103
 
On this perspective, practices produce order by facilitating a particular 
understanding of the world on the part of those agents who participate in it. 
Order comes about per force of the stable reproduction of socially significant 
activities. On this account, shared knowledge is an ingredient in the cement of 
society, enhanced by way of routinization. 
From the direct effects of practices, let me briefly turn to their interaction 
effects. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, in a recent attempt to theorize the 
logic of international practices, have distinguished among four types of 
relationships that can obtain between or among individual practices.104 For the 
purpose of this discussion of order-producing effects of practices, I will only 
touch on the fourth type of relationship, which they call “subordination.”105 
Under this tightest of constellations, practices are arranged in a hierarchical 
manner. Some practices are said to “anchor” other practices by making them 
possible. The example that Adler and Pouliot give, and that is of immediate 
import for the study of international law, is the practice of sovereignty 
 
 102.  See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 100. Exemplary of the growing literature on nineteenth century 
practices are PÄR KRISTOFFER CASSEL, GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND 
IMPERIAL POWER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA AND JAPAN (2012) (showing how 
extraterritoriality emerged, how its practice evolved in Japan and China, and why both territories were 
affected rather differently) and TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA (2010) (theorizing and 
exploring in relevant cases the rise and fall of extraterritoriality as an instrument of colonial rule). 
 103.  Schatzki, Introduction: Practice Theory, supra note 9, at 5.  
 104.  They distinguish among “parallel existence,” “symbiosis,” “hybridization,” and 
“subordination.” Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot, International Practices: Introduction and 
Framework, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 40, at 3, 20–21.  
 105.  Id. at 20. On their argument, parallel existence points to a relationship that is superficial. In 
this constellation, “practices are linked in space and/or time but they do not significantly interfere. This 
may be because these practices belong to different registers of social life, because they perform unalike 
functions, because they make use of unrelated tools, etc.” Id. A symbiotic relationship among practices 
exists, next, when “practices remain distinct but they form a coherent whole in which the parts . . . are 
united in a mutually reinforcing relationship.” Id. Hybridization, third, describes a constellation in 
which interacting practices combine to form an entirely new practice, that is, “[e]lements of different 
practices are rearranged into a hybrid new form that replaces past ways of doing.” Id. 
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anchoring the practice of diplomacy.106 Theoretically speaking, “[i]n these 
hierarchical bundles, one practice may become the dominant form of a set of 
subordinated practices, which may nonetheless continue to be practiced.”107 
With further reference to international law, some might say that subordination 
has begun to characterize the relationship between the long-standing practice of 
juridical statehood and the newer practices associated with the “new 
humanitarianism.” If we believe the more optimistic observers of international 
politics, the doings and sayings that were observable under the banner of the so-
called responsibility to protect (R2P) in particular have inaugurated a new 
hierarchy of international practices.108 It is worth reiterating here that practices 
require agents to exist in the first place. Absent any agentic input, practices will 
have no meaningful effect. As Adler and Pouliot write, 
[W]e want to insist that agency is front and center in the interplay of practice, if only 
because it is practitioners who, ultimately, are the performers. Put in simple terms, the 
reason why a given bundle of practices follows a particular scenario and not others has 
less to do with how it fits together—a functional argument—than with how it is fitted 
together as a result of political struggles. The politics of practice concern the ways in 
which agents struggle to endow certain practices with political validity and 
legitimacy.
109
 
Yet contrary to Adler and Pouliot’s formulation, not every practice follows 
the logic of political struggle. Some constellations of practices will form for 
reasons other than contentious politics. Adler and Pouliot’s instrumental take 
on the logic of practices overlooks the spontaneous emergence of routinized 
ways of acting on the social world. International law is full of such spontaneous 
practices. This is an important insight in a time when “the politics of 
international law” are the preferred point of departure for IR scholars, which 
causes them to neglect a large swath of what international lawyers actually do. 
Though politics informs a great deal of international law, it does not govern all 
of it, and certainly not all of the time. It is this latter slice of reality, located at 
the intersection of the political and the mundane, that deserves closer scrutiny 
than it has attracted thus far. 
In the foregoing, I have provided an overview of the logic of practices as if 
there were such a thing as a unified practice theory. Maintaining this fiction was 
necessary in order not to get bogged down in the abstract technicalities that 
have accompanied the practice turn in contemporary theory. 
After these preliminaries, however, a few caveats are in order. Barry Barnes 
put them so well that there is no need to paraphrase. In deploying practice 
theory, writes Barnes, 
 
 
 106.  Id. at 20. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  On the idea of R2P, see, for example, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF 
STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME (Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2011). For a more 
sophisticated and critical account, see ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011).   
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it must be recognized that: (a) no simple either/or contrast can be made between 
‘theory’ and ‘practice;’ (b) no indefeasible distinction can be made between visible 
external practices and invisible, internal states; (c) any attempt to give a satisfactory 
description of social life must make reference to much else besides practice; and (d) 
practice does not account for its own production and reproduction.
110
 
Finally, although this article, and the issue that it frames, make a case for a 
practice turn in the study of international law, I am nonetheless cognizant of the 
limitations, and of the potential dangers, associated with doing so. It is 
therefore worth echoing the cautionary note sounded by Jörg Friedrichs and 
Friedrich Kratochwil in another effort at theorizing about practically embedded 
knowledge. Addressing the recent practice turn in IR, they rightly insist that 
this analytical reorientation “should not preclude more conventional research 
into power, interest, preferences, and so on.”111 As they put it, “After ‘culture’ 
and ‘discourse,’ we should beware of ‘practice’ as yet another totalizing 
ontology that aspires to encompass everything social.”112 In the same vein, my 
argument for more theoretically sophisticated and empirically grounded 
scholarship on legal practices in the international system should be understood 
as a plea for complementing the methodological toolkit currently available to 
IL and IR scholars of international law, not as a clarion call intended to rally 
support for supplanting conventional perspectives on international law. My 
overriding analytical objective is to make the study of international law more 
diverse—not less so. With a preliminary understanding in place of both what 
practices are and how they work, we are in a position to delve more deeply into 
the theory of practices. 
IV 
THE THEORY OF PRACTICES 
Although the focus on practices as discrete units of analysis is relatively 
new, practice-based ontology has a long pedigree. In this part of the article, I 
trace the genealogy of practices—and with it the uneven development and 
mixed fortunes of practice-oriented reasoning in the humanities and social 
sciences—from ancient to postmodern times. This intellectual history, though 
necessarily abbreviated, is essential for clarifying what stands to be gained from 
relating practical knowledge to scientific knowledge in explanations of 
international legal phenomena such as the adjudication of international crimes 
at the ICC. Moreover, by exploring the universe of practice-based reasoning 
across space and time, we gain a better appreciation of the promise—and 
limits—of alternative routes for bringing practices into the study of 
international law. 
 
 
 110.  Barry Barnes, Practice as Collective Action, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY 
THEORY, supra note 9, at 17, 19. 
 111.  Jörg Friedrichs & Friedrich Kratochwil, On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can 
Advance International Relations Research and Methodology, 63 INT’L ORG. 701, 713 n.56 (2009). 
 112.  Id.  
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My goal in this part of the article is to encourage the pursuit of all kinds of 
practice-based research designs by IL and IR scholars, whether they take their 
cue from Aristotle’s idea of phronesis, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, or any other member in the “large family of 
terms . . . used more or less interchangeably with ‘practices.’”113 The upshot, 
then, is this: In order to truly grasp international law, in the Weberian sense of 
achieving an “empathetic understanding” thereof, we have no choice but to 
enter, as deeply as we can, the webs of significance that practitioners spin.114 
Being able to choose the methodological and theoretical tools most appropriate 
to the twin tasks of immersion and disentanglement, in turn, requires 
comprehensive knowledge of practice theory, broadly conceived. Before 
turning to the ICC, I will therefore rehearse alternative perspectives for 
illuminating the reality of international law, all of which fall under the broader 
rubric of practice theory. All of these practice-oriented approaches are in 
principle compatible with other theories of social action, yet each would need to 
be reconfigured for the study of international law. It is here where the potential 
for analytical innovation lies—in the adaptation of highly abstract, and not 
infrequently purely philosophical, theories of practice for the empirical study of 
international legal phenomena. 
A. Ancient Perspectives 
What Martha Nussbaum has called “the controlling power of reason” 
dominated the classical Greek approach to knowledge.115 A quest for certainty, 
and thus universal principles of life, united much classical thought. In the 
ancient world, the philosophy of Plato was responsible for establishing a 
hierarchy of knowledge. In his writings, notably in The Republic, his famous 
Socratic dialogue, he developed a theory of universals that put a premium on a 
representational epistemology. It is Plato to whom we owe the widespread 
belief in the superiority of scientific knowledge because “Plato effectively cast 
practice, materiality, and performativity beyond, or more precisely below, the 
scope of theory of knowledge.”116 The assignment of low value to practical 
knowledge stemmed from the assumption that “good practice” could only be 
derived from eternal principles.117 As a consequence, the willingness of most 
Greek philosophers to accord analytical significance to the particularities of life, 
 
 113.  STEPHEN TURNER, THE SOCIAL THEORY OF PRACTICES: TRADITION, TACIT KNOWLEDGE, 
AND PRESUPPOSITIONS 2 (1994). 
 114.  I am here paraphrasing both Weber, for whom man was an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, as well as Clifford Geertz, who took culture to represent those webs. 
What both had in common was an unshakable belief in the necessity of an interpretive rather than 
scientific search for meaning. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 5 (1973).  
 115.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK 
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (1986). 
 116.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 25. 
 117.  Id. at 24. 
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including its everyday practices, was very limited. After all, only Plato’s 
philosopher kings were deemed worthy of governing his utopian city of 
Kallipolis.118 One exception proved the rule—Aristotle, who, as it turns out, put 
considerably more stock in the value of practical knowledge than his teacher. 
Although it is sometimes said that Aristotle, by distinguishing theory and 
practice as two distinct epistemic objects, “laid the foundation for the historical 
demise of practice in the Western tradition,” a closer reading of his 
philosophical oeuvre reveals a thinker who was far more comfortable with 
different ways of knowing than Plato, to much of the rest of whose belief system 
he stayed true.119 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle established what he 
called “praxis” as a separate form of knowledge. For him, praxis was a 
phenomenon without moral qualifications.120 At the same time, he thought it 
relevant for making sense of life. 
Aristotle’s interest in practical knowledge is apparent in his distinction, 
developed in the Nicomachean Ethics, among three kinds of knowing: episteme, 
phronesis, and techne. Moving beyond Plato, for whom scientific knowledge 
(episteme) was the only relevant activity of the human mind, Aristotle thought 
practical wisdom (phronesis) and what we might call art or craft or skill (techne) 
were also deserving of philosophical reflection. In his philosophy, “[t]he aim of 
phronesis is to produce praxis or action informed by knowledgeable value-
driven deliberations; the aim of techne, instrumental rationality, is poiesis, i.e. 
the creation or production of material or durable artefacts.”121 Aristotle’s 
introduction of praxis as an independent form of knowledge has had a far-
reaching effect on the philosophy of knowledge. It gave credence to the 
argument that theory and practice are incommensurable, that practical 
knowledge cannot be reduced to theoretical universals. Practical wisdom on 
Aristotle’s account cannot be fully summed up in rules and guides for action 
without its essential attribute—contingency—becoming lost in the translation. 
As he put it, 
It is obvious that practical wisdom is not deductive scientific understanding 
(episteme). . . . [P]ractical wisdom is of the ultimate and particular, of which there is no 
scientific understanding, but a kind of perception—not, I mean, ordinary sense-
perception of the proper objects of each sense, but the sort of perception by which we 
grasp that a certain figure is composed in a certain way out of triangles.
122
 
In other words, Aristotle, like contemporary practice theorists, took 
exception to the assumption, as widespread then as now, that all comprehension 
of the world was rational and intentional. For Aristotle, as Nussbaum noted, 
 
 118.  See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R. E. Allen trans., 2006). 
 119.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 23–24. 
 120.  Elizabeth Belfiore, Aristotle’s Concept of Praxis in the Poetics, 79 CLASSICAL J. 110, 110–11 
(1983). 
 121.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 26; see also NIKOLAUS LOBKOWICZ, THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
HISTORY OF A CONCEPT FROM ARISTOTLE TO MARX (1967). 
 122.  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, ch. VIII, l. 1142a (Sarah Broadie & Christopher 
Rowe eds., Oxford University Press 2002).  
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“[p]ractical insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is non-inferential, non-
deductive; it is, centrally, the ability to recognize, acknowledge, respond to, pick 
out certain salient features of a complex situation.”123 It follows from this that 
praxis “cannot even in principle be adequately captured in a system of universal 
rules—and hence cannot be the subject of episteme, because it has to do with 
mutability, indeterminacy, and particulars.”124 This rendering in the classic 
tradition of praxis as a nondeductive and nonrepresentational form of 
knowledge had profound consequences for modern perspectives on the nature 
and meanings of social practices. 
Bent Flyvbjerg, more than anyone, has popularized the idea of phronesis in 
the social sciences. Indeed, he has developed, during the last decade or so, a 
sustained case for a “phronetic social science,” which recently culminated in the 
publication of a policy manifesto of sorts.125 Flyvbjerg’s scholarship, the latest 
Aristotelian twist in the so-called practice turn in contemporary social theory, is 
an amalgam of insights from Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, Michel 
Foucault, Clifford Geertz, and a few other twentieth century thinkers who 
displayed an analytical preference for practical over epistemic knowledge in the 
study of the social world. “Phronetic research,” Flyvbjerg writes, 
focuses on practical activity and practical knowledge in everyday situations. It may 
mean, but is certainly not limited to, a focus on known sociological, ethnographic, and 
historical phenomena such as “everyday life” and “everyday people.” What it always 
means, however, is a focus on the actual daily practices which constitute a given field 
of interest, regardless of whether these practices take place on the floor of a stock 
exchange, a grassroots organization, a hospital, or a local school board.
126
 
Or in an international court, for that matter. 
At the same time, it is important to note that phronesis, or prudence, in the 
original Aristotelian formulation was imbued with a deep ethical imperative. 
Phronesis was a virtue to be striven for, part of the recipe for a good life. It was 
a moral position, not a methodological one, as it would subsequently become 
for Bourdieu and other twentieth-century theorists of practice. As Chris Brown 
usefully reminds us, 
Aristotle is not a social scientist in any modern sense of the term, even in a sense of 
the term that could incorporate Bourdieu; his concern in the Nicomachean Ethics is 
with the living of a good life rather than with a desire to understand social 
practices. . . . [T]he Aristotelian notion of phronesis is always about the exercise of the 
faculty of reason, which is not the case with Bourdieu’s formulation.
127
 
 
 123.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 115, at 305. 
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 125.  REAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: APPLIED PHRONESIS (Bent Flyvbjerg, Todd Landman & Sanford 
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B. Modern Perspectives 
Modern perspectives are worth contemplating because they allow us to gain 
greater clarity about the intellectual contributions that can potentially flow 
from practice-driven knowledge. Importantly, despite the Aristotelian focus on 
praxis as an inherently valuable—and independent—form of knowledge, it took 
until the late nineteenth century for practice to be taken seriously again. In the 
intervening two thousand years, the notion of praxis came to be reinterpreted 
as merely a dependent category, “the practical application of a-practical, purely 
theoretical insights.”128 The rise of rationalism, from Galileo to Descartes to 
Kant, led to the degradation of practical wisdom. Practices were deemed 
irrelevant to the ontology of being in the world. 
1. Marx 
A daring philosophical challenge to this mind-over-matter view of the world 
came in 1845 from Karl Marx, at the time a young revolutionary intent on 
making a case for the all-important structuring effect of what he called 
“historical materialism.”129 In The German Ideology, Marx, together with 
Friedrich Engels, raised the analytical status of the practices of everyday life. 
Whatever one makes of the ideological content of early and subsequent 
variants of Marxism, it is undeniable that Marx and Engels created the first 
modern template for recognizing practices and for subjecting them to rigorous 
analysis: 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. . . . In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from 
heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out 
from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, 
imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active 
men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the 
ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. . . . Life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life. . . . As soon as this active life-process is 
described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists 
(themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the 
idealists. Where speculation ends—in real life—there real, positive science begins: the 
representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of 
men.
130
 
This is still a far cry from practice theory in the twenty-first century, but The 
German Ideology, perhaps more than any other work in the modern world, 
encouraged and theoretically motivated the analytical preoccupation with 
ostensibly mundane aspects of social life, thereby bringing back, albeit in a 
 
 128.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 28. 
 129.  On the concept of historical materialism, see, most importantly, KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH 
ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (1846), as reprinted in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (David 
McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000). For an influental and sophisticted contemporary 
restatement, see G. A. COHEN, KARL MARX’S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (expanded ed. 
2000). 
 130.  MARX & ENGELS, supra note 129, at 175, 180–81. 
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different guise, the discarded idea of praxis. Although Aristotle and Marx were 
interested with radically different questions of substance, they shared a belief in 
the epistemological value of practical knowledge. Whereas Aristotle’s effort in 
the ancient world to spread the word about the centrality of practice ultimately 
failed, “[o]ne enduring legacy of Marx’s work is the successful attempt to 
challenge centuries of Western rationalist and mentalist tradition, and to 
legitimate real activity, what ‘sensuous’ people actually do in their everyday life, 
as an object of consideration and as an explanatory category in [the] social 
sciences.”131 As a consequence of Marx’s attention to the interconnectedness of 
social life, and especially his unprecedented focus on individuals as corporeal 
beings, practice in the late nineteenth century was “becoming the ontological 
principle of being in the world.”132 
2. Heidegger 
Recent interpretations of the phenomenological tradition in Western 
philosophy, especially of Heidegger’s writings, have led observers to conclude 
that the German’s existentialist writings contributed in major ways to the 
recovery of practice as a worthwhile object of study in the twentieth century. 
Starting with Friedrich Nietzsche, who is often seen as the main impetus behind 
the rise of phenomenology, philosophers began to question the contrived 
separation of theory and practice that had survived virtually intact since Plato’s 
reflections on the topic in the ancient world. Nietzsche, for one, imagined a 
primordial unity of theory and practice. As one commentator writes, “Nietzsche 
posited at the centre of the activity of philosophy a ‘human, all-too human 
subject’ that is not only a thinking subject but an initiator of action and a centre 
of feeling.”133 Philosophical inquiries into the nature and boundaries of 
existence were at the heart of the phenomenological tradition, as encapsulated 
most famously in Heidegger’s 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time.134 In it, he 
gave extensive space to the contemplation of what he called Dasein, which 
translates literally as “there-being” but was meant to draw attention to the 
activity of existing, the state of being-in-the-world.135 The intricacies of this 
notoriously difficult concept need not concern us here.136 Relevant for our 
purposes is the fact that Heidegger’s interest in the nature of being gave 
credence to the investigation of practices, or the inner structure of normality. 
Because the fact of existence is not reducible to any a priori logic, Heidegger 
sought to come to terms with the essence of what he called “everydayness” 
(Alltäglichkeit).137 
 
 131.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 29. 
 132.  Id. at 29.  
 133.  Id. at 33–34.  
 134.  MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962). 
 135.  NICOLINI, 43, at 36. 
 136.  For the leading interpretation of Heidegger’s classic, see HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-IN-
THE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME, DIVISION I (1991). 
 137.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 34. 
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He thought the ordinariness of everydayness was essential to try to grasp 
analytically because it was “constantly overlooked in its ontological 
significance” and yet inherently inescapable as a constant of our existence.138 
Everydayness, in turn, was comprised of all kinds of social practices. 
One’s everyday world is meaningfully structured by these practices which can remain 
untaught and yet which we more or less share in common. Practice therefore implies 
an individual’s social and historical relation to the world, where one’s own concrete 
practices are themselves set up and made meaningful within this wider background 
system of intelligibility. Mundane everydayness thus becomes the received, yet 
necessarily indeterminate, cultural manifold within which we are all immersed, and 
which meaningfully discloses our world by way of our own un-theorized, everyday 
practical coping strategies.
139
 
From this flows the theoretical argument that the totality of practices that make 
up everydayness is so manifold that it usually escapes our attention, and 
therewith representation. Practices are seen as nonrepresentational aspects of 
social life because even though they affect behavior meaningfully, they tend to 
do so in unreflective ways. Practices are the unarticulated underbelly of our 
social lives. Because they are part and parcel of our being, we fail to appreciate 
their centrality. 
Even though Heidegger never developed a coherent account of practical 
knowledge, his philosophical writings were essential to the subsequent 
development of theories of practice. “[B]y reversing the Cartesian tradition and 
making the individual subject dependent on a web of social practices, he made 
it possible for others to develop one.”140 
3. Wittgenstein 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Austrian philosopher of language, had a similar, 
perhaps an even more important effect on the practice turn in contemporary 
social theory. As one protagonist of the latter remarked, “Wittgenstein is the 
philosopher to whom nearly all theorists of practice defer.”141 As might be 
expected, Wittgenstein’s reflections on practice largely emanated from his 
theory of language. In the process of developing his all-important concept of 
“language games,” he theorized, among other things, the nature of rule 
following. The substance of Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings on the 
meaning of rules is not of relevance for our discussion. Yet it is important that 
his larger theoretical effort led him to think of rule following in terms of 
practical knowledge. As he put it in Philosophical Investigations, a collection of 
693 numbered paragraphs of theoretical reflections that were published 
posthumously in 1953, “‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is 
obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.”142 He continues, “When I obey a rule, I do 
 
 138.  HEIDEGGER, supra note 134, at 43.  
 139.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 35.  
 140.  Id. at 37. 
 141.  H. M. Collins, What Is Tacit Knowledge?, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY 
THEORY, supra note 9, at 107. 
 142.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 202 (G. E. M. Anscombe 
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not choose. I obey the rule blindly.”143 Wittgenstein introduces the example of a 
signpost to elucidate the distinction between thinking behavior (what we might 
call choice) and nonthinking behavior (what he thinks of as practice): 
Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post—got to do with my 
actions? What sort of connexion is there here?—Well, perhaps this one: I have been 
trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. But that is 
only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the 
sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have 
further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a 
regular use of sign-posts, a custom.
144
 
Or, as Wittgenstein argued elsewhere, “rules leave loopholes open, and the 
practice has to speak for itself.”145 I will draw out the implication of this for the 
study of international law below, but for now it is important to appreciate that 
Wittgenstein’s concern with the nature and meaning of unreflective behavior, 
that is, with the nonrational responses of individuals to their surroundings, 
echoes Aristotle’s reflections on praxis, Marx’s interest in practical activity, and 
Heidegger’s concept of everydayness.146 
Like his predecessors, Wittgenstein found it difficult to fully grasp, 
conceptually and theoretically, the logic of this “inherited background” due to 
the fact that practical knowledge is just that: practical, not theoretical.147 
Consequently, its unarticulated nature poses limits to representation. This 
restriction notwithstanding, Wittgenstein was convinced that the rationalist 
assumption according to which all action was preceded by thought was 
untenable. The philosopher Charles Taylor has interpreted Wittgenstein’s 
argument thus: “[M]uch of our intelligent action in the world, sensitive as it 
usually is to our situation and goals, is carried on unformulated. It flows from an 
understanding that is largely inarticulate.”148 Like Heidegger before him, 
Wittgenstein believed that “the source of intelligibility of the world is the 
average public practices through which alone there can be any understanding at 
all.”149 Making these practices visible in the area of international law—and 
encouraging practitioners to reflect on and articulate them—is my purpose in 
this article. Some philosophers have called for “embodied understandings” of 
the world around us to facilitate such an interpretive analysis. As Taylor writes, 
Background understanding, which underlies our ability to grasp directions and follow 
rules, is to a large degree embodied. . . . As long as we think of understanding in the 
old intellectualist fashion, as residing in thoughts or representations, it is hard to 
explain how we can know how to follow a rule, or in any way behave rightly, without 
 
trans., 1953) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS]. 
 143.  Id. § 219. 
 144.  Id. §198. 
 145.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY §139 (Denis Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 
1969) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY].  
 146.  I should note that I reserve the term “behavior” for unintentional and the term “action” for 
intentional doings. 
 147.  WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY, supra note 145, § 94. 
 148.  CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 170 (1995). 
 149.  DREYFUS, supra note 136, at 155. 
1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:29 AM 
Nos. 3 & 4 2013] THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 
having the thoughts to justify this behavior as right. . . . [I]ntellectualism leaves us only 
with the choice between an understanding that consists of representations and no 
understanding at all. Embodied understanding provides us with the third alternative 
we need to make sense of ourselves. 
At the same time, it allows us to show the connections of this understanding to social 
practice. My embodied understanding doesn’t only exist in me as an individual agent, 
but also as the coagent of common actions. This is the sense we can give to 
Wittgenstein’s claim that obeying a rule is a practice.
150
 
In the context of language, with which Wittgenstein was concerned in his 
reflections on the logic of rules, Wittgenstein insisted that the meaning of a 
word could not be determined, at least not fully, by only acquiring the rules 
according to which the word is used.151 He argued that there was more to the 
construction of meaning. “And this additional element is brought out with the 
help of the concept of practice.”152 On Wittgenstein’s argument, 
[i]t follows that rules are necessarily related to the established ways of following them. 
That has as a consequence that rules actually get their identity from the very practices 
in which they are embedded. As such they can never be fully understood except by 
those who can successfully perform the practices in question.
153
 
Although Wittgenstein was focused on linguistic practices, it is possible to 
derive valuable insights from his reflections about the relationship between 
meaning and language for the study of other social practices. Simply put, 
Wittgenstein sensitized scholars to the possibility that social meaning “cannot 
be properly conceived of as properties of individual consciousness,” as 
rationalist accounts of the world will have us believe, “and instead should be 
conceived relationally as the result of the practical activity of sensuous and 
engaged agents.”154 This perspective has not only ontological but also important 
methodological implications for the study of practices in international law, as I 
shall discuss in detail below, most notably because “[i]n all determination of 
sense there does seem to be involved an element of skill as well as an element 
of familiarity with the actual phenomena concerned.”155 If we take this to be 
true, ethnographic research is a sine qua non for exploring the really existing 
practices of the ICC and other sites of international law. But before I turn to 
the study of international law, I must sketch in more of the theoretical 
background necessary for grasping the potential of treating practices as both 
explananda and explanans—as things to be explained and as things that do the 
explaining. 
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4. Giddens 
The emphasis in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language on the practical 
activity of “sensuous and engaged agents,” as Nicolini put it, reappears in 
Anthony Giddens’s sociology, which set out, in the late 1970s, “to promote a 
recovery of the subject,” without lapsing into subjectivism.156 In this endeavor, 
Giddens, too, turned to the idea of practice. Giddens is also worth mentioning 
because his account of structuration—a particular solution to the so-called 
agent–structure problem in the social sciences—went on to influence the 
construction of (important strands of) constructivism in IR theory, which 
represents the most important paradigmatic development in the subfield since 
the emergence of neoliberal institutionalism in the late 1970s and the 
concomitant rise of rationalism as the dominant perspective from which to 
approach the study of international politics (including international law). 
In The Constitution of Society, an abstract treatment of ontology, Giddens 
presented the building blocks of his theory of structuration.157 To begin with, in 
his influential theory Giddens argued against favoring either microlevel or 
macrolevel analyses of empirical phenomena. Rather than prioritizing agents 
over structures or structures over agents in explanations, he sketched a third 
ontological way.158 Traveling down this route required a belief in the mutual 
constitution of agents and structures. Through action, so the argument goes, 
agents produce structures. Although agents, by operating within structures and 
as a consequence of what Giddens termed “reflexive monitoring,” at some 
point will transform structures, they also are bound by them.159 This structural 
embeddedness can enable agents or constrain them. Either way, agents will, on 
Giddens’s argument, draw upon the knowledge—practical and otherwise—that 
they continuously acquire in the structural context in which they find 
themselves when they act.160 Elsewhere, Giddens summarized the essence of his 
theory as follows: “I argue that neither subject (human agent) nor object 
(‘society,’ or social institutions) should be regarded as having primacy. Each is 
constituted in and through recurrent practices.”161 
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Interestingly, Giddens draws a straight line from Marx to Wittgenstein to 
himself: 
I take the significance of Wittgenstein’s writings for social theory to consist in the 
association of language with definite social practices. . . . I do want to propose that 
there is a direct continuity between Marx and Wittgenstein in respect of the 
production and reproduction of society as Praxis.
162
 
The operative “theorem” in his theory of structuration is the “duality of 
structure,” by which Giddens means “the essential recursiveness of social life, 
as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the 
reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution 
of the agent and social practices, and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this 
constitution.”163 
In contradistinction to other theorists of practice we have encountered thus 
far, Giddens starts from the premise that agents are both knowledgeable and 
reflexive.164 Although these agents behave in part on the basis of tacit, practical 
knowledge, Giddens thinks them nevertheless capable of formulating aims, 
contemplating reasons, and monitoring choices.165 Put differently, although 
agents are not always self-aware, they sometimes are. “Although human actors 
usually proceed unhampered in their daily business they are by no means 
structural dupes. . . . Giddens’ pressing task is that of reversing the conceptual 
elimination of the subject and promoting its recovery without lapsing into 
subjectivism.”166 Theodore Schatzki has provided the most lucid—if dense—
representation of the place of practices in Giddens’s theory of structuration. 
Schatzki’s summary is worth reproducing at length, because it also relates the 
phenomenon of practices to all of the other moving parts in Giddens’s 
complicated account of the duality of structure in the constitution of society: 
[S]tructures are sets of rules and resources, which are at once the medium in which 
practices are carried out and the renewed result of their execution. Since practices 
compose systems, the structural properties of social systems are likewise sets of rules 
and resources . . . that are both medium and result of system practices. What’s more, 
since practices and systems are composed of actions, the ultimate reason why rules 
and resources structure practices and systems is that actors draw on rules and 
resources in their interactions. In doing so, they perpetuate the practices of whose 
structure the rules and resources are elements, and thereby also help reproduce the 
social system composed by these (and other) practices.
167
 
The above sketch of logical entanglements illustrates what recursiveness is 
all about for Giddens. The recursive reproduction of the social is eased to the 
extent that practices are routinized, which is the case whenever they are taken 
for granted: “Routines provide both cognitive economy and anxiety reduction 
 
 162.  GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 156, at 4. 
 163.  Id. at 5. 
 164.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 47. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 146. 
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and control.”168 
Central to Giddens’s account of the logic of practices are two additional 
concepts: rules and resources. The former refer to norms and codes that 
describe the generalized procedures involved in the constitution of practices; 
the latter connote the material and symbolic capabilities that enable—or 
disable—opportunities for action.169 Practices, according to Giddens, “‘happen’ 
and are ‘made to happen’ through the application of resources in the continuity 
of daily life.”170 In explicating this continuity, Giddens puts a premium on what 
he calls “practical consciousness,” or tacit modes of knowing that come about 
without reflection, let alone deliberation. As he remarked with reference to 
linguistic practices, 
A double occlusion occurs if the area of practical consciousness is left unexplored, as 
has characteristically been the case in much research work in sociology. If what actors 
are able to say about the conditions of their activity appears slight, or unconvincing, 
the researcher begins to cast about for other factors which determine why they behave 
as they do. To adopt such a tactic is to blank out the very grounding of human 
knowledgeability in the continuity of skilfully reproduced practices. It is like 
supposing that what the speakers of a language can articulate about the rules and 
procedures they use in speaking or writing is all they “know” about the language.
171
 
It is important to appreciate in this context that Giddens, in a major 
intellectual departure, advanced practice theory by relating representational to 
nonrepresentational aspects of action, making a case for the co-constitution of 
action. He insisted that social practices should be viewed as a “conjunction of 
intended and unintended outcomes of conduct.”172 One consequence of 
Giddens’s self-proclaimed recovery of the subject, in other words, was the 
creation of a locus for rationality in practice theory. Previous theorists, as we 
have seen, felt compelled to equate all practical action with a nonrational way 
of doing things. 
What does this understanding of practices have to offer the study of the 
practice of international law? The problem with Giddens, as many of his critics 
have pointed out, is his unwillingness or inability (perhaps both) to translate his 
abstract ideas about the constitution of society into viable research designs for 
empirical inquiry.173 As one observer recently noted, “Giddens not only did not 
put his theory to the test of empirical research, he also failed to provide any 
exemplification of his approach, and explicitly refrained and even resisted 
putting his theory into a methodological package for pursuing empirical 
 
 168.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 48. 
 169.  GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 156, at 65–69. 
 170.  Giddens, Hermeneutics and Social Theory, supra note 161, at 9–10. 
 171.  Anthony Giddens, Comments on the Theory of Structuration, 13 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 75, 
76 (1983). 
 172.  Id. at 77. 
 173.  Giddens initially appears to have tried, however. See GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 327–43 (reflecting on the implications of structuration theory for empirical 
research, notably the “hermeneutic aspects” of both quantitative and qualitative research and the 
interrelationship between these two forms of social inquiry). 
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inquiry.”174 For now it is sufficient to note that the idea of practice is the 
linchpin in Giddens’s theory of structuration, as a result of which it gained 
greater currency in the social sciences. The notion is so central in fact that 
Giddens, together with Pierre Bourdieu, is sometimes thought to be a 
figurehead of a research program known as “social praxeology.”175 
C. Postmodern Perspectives 
1. Bourdieu 
It is sometimes said that Bourdieu, a French sociologist, left a greater mark 
on practice theory than Giddens. The reason for this perceived contribution is 
usually attributed to the former’s willingness to conduct empirical research, 
ethnographic and otherwise: 
Bourdieu always believed in the fundamental importance of starting the study of 
human conducts from the appreciation and representation of real-time practices. 
However, one of his key theoretical points was that representing practice is not 
enough: practice needs to be explained, and this is what makes sociologists different 
from anthropologists and other social scientists. While the object of the work of the 
latter is what practices are and how they behave, the former need to address the issue 
of why practices are the way they are and why they are not different. To this end, he 
developed over the years a theory of both practice and “practice-based theorizing” 
that has fundamental implications for any attempts to extend practice thinking to new 
domains such as organization studies.
176
 
Because I am concerned in this article with just such an endeavor—the 
extension of practice theory to the study of international law—a closer look at 
Bourdieu’s writings is essential. 
In Distinction, his famous book on the judgment of taste, Bourdieu captured 
the essence of his logic of practice thus: 
 
[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice177 
 
Although space constraints disallow an in-depth discussion of Bourdieu’s 
theoretical concepts, a brief primer is in order. In Bourdieu’s parlance, the 
concept of habitus refers to a deeply inscribed—and internalized—way of 
knowing that individuals acquire in passing as a by-product of all forms of 
socialization, whether at home, at work, or at play.178 As the theoretical linchpin 
 
 174.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 50. The disinterest in empirical explification is germane to most of 
the philosophers and social theorists whose ideas I have brought into the fold of this theoretical 
contribution to the study of international law. In response to this general predicament, I will, below, 
outline a concrete, if tentative, agenda for making empirical contributions to the practical study of 
international law in the form of what I refer to as analytic narratives. See supra Part VI. 
 175.  The term was coined by Loïc Wacquant. See Loïc Wacquant, Toward a Social Praxeology: The 
Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology, in AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 1, 11 
(Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc J. D. Wacquant eds., 1992).  
 176.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 53. 
 177.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 101 
(1984) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION]. 
 178.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 55. 
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of his far-ranging writings, the presence of habitus, Bourdieu argued, is 
knowledge-producing in the sense that its structural properties constitute a 
particular type of social environment, which, in turn, enable—and delimit—
practical action by individuals in and on the world. Put differently, for 
Bourdieu, the irrepressible force of habitus serves at all times as a parameter to 
individual choice, usually without being noticed. Here is how the French 
sociologist put it himself, if a tad obscurely: 
[Habitus is a] system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate 
and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of 
the operations necessary in order to attain them.
179
 
Though, on Bourdieu’s account, the concept of habitus is indispensable to 
the production of practices, it is not alone sufficient for constituting social 
practices. Rather, practices are produced by the interaction of habitus with two 
related concepts—namely, capital and field. Again, both terms come with a 
great deal of theoretical baggage, which I am sidestepping for ease of 
presentation. Simply put, the concept of capital connotes all material and 
nonmaterial forms of currency that are suitable for and used in the pursuit of a 
given interest, from accumulation to domination. The definition of a given 
interest is governed by one’s habitus, which has a strong relationship to group 
and class membership. The concept of the field, finally, captures the 
constellation of forces that, semiautonomously, generate the rules by which 
positions of authority, power, legitimacy, and influence are defined and 
allocated in a given society. Most societies are comprised of numerous fields, 
many of which coincide with major spheres of life, including art, education, law, 
politics, and religion, to name but a few. Bourdieu’s logic of practice assumes 
that a mutually constitutive relationship exists between habitus and field, 
facilitated by the circulation of capital: “[I]nvolvement in a field shapes the 
habitus that, once activated, reproduces the field. On the other hand, habitus 
only operates in relation with the state of the field and on the basis of the 
possibilities of action granted by the capital associated with the position.”180 On 
this conceptual foundation, we can return to the schematic formula of 
Bourdieu’s “general science of practices” with which we began.181 
 
 
 179.  BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 53. For an example of readings 
critical of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, see Raymond W. K. Lau, Habitus and the Practical Logic of 
Practice: An Interpretation, 38 SOC. 369 (2004).  
 180.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 60. For an incisive critique of what he calls Bourdieu’s “conceptual 
morass,” especially as it pertains to the interacting concepts of field and practice, see Alan Warde, 
Practice and Field: Revising Bourdieusian Concepts (Ctr. for Research on Innovation and Competition, 
Univ. of Manchester, Discussion Paper No. 65, 2004), available at http://www.cric.ac.uk/ 
cric/pdfs/dp65.pdf. 
 181.  For a sustained critique of Bourdieu’s effort to develop a “general science of practice,” see 
Theodore Richard Schatzki, Overdue Analysis of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, 30 INQUIRY 113 
(1987).    
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The simple formula conveys both the theoretical unity and diversity at the 
heart of Bourdieu’s practice theory. On the one hand, his formulaic depiction 
suggests that the logic of practices is a constant feature of social interaction; on 
the other hand, it also makes plain that the logic of practices differs with 
context. Accordingly, Bourdieu speaks of “the unity hidden under the diversity 
and multiplicity of the set of practices performed in fields governed by different 
logics and therefore inducing different forms of realization.”182 In other words, 
practices are pervasive and constantly involved in the construction of social 
reality. Yet their precise effect is a function of the interplay between habitus 
and capital and the characteristics of a particular field. For much of his 
intellectual life Bourdieu was intrigued by the relationship between induction 
and deduction. With his imperfect and reductionist formula, he may well have 
intended to strike a balance between the tenets of subjectivist and objectivist 
modes of knowledge, both of which he rejected in their pure forms. 
Although Bourdieu was not always as subtle and consistent in articulating 
the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism as he could have been, one 
of his enduring contributions to practice theory was to attach individuals 
relationally to the social and historical contexts in which they dwell. His 
relational method was founded on a deep-seated suspicion of all attempts to 
reify the attributes of individuals and groups. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that he deemed descriptive accounts by practitioners analytically worthless. 
One of Bourdieu’s leading interpreters explains why: 
This epistemological stance is necessitated by the very nature of insider accounts of 
their own practices. Insider representations reflect the practical logic of getting along 
in their social world, and hence are to be understood as instruments of struggle for 
practical accomplishments rather than attempts to draw a coherent and objective 
picture of actor behavior. While scientific representations are constructed out of the 
representations of everyday practices, the latter cannot be substituted for the 
former.
183
 
What follows from this for the study of practice in international law? It 
follows that purely descriptive accounts of any international legal practice will 
not be enough to render comprehensible its social logic and effects, especially in 
organizational settings. The Bourdieusian analysis of practices “involves the 
construction of the fields where they occur and the habitus of the agents 
brought to those fields” as well as the kinds of capital under their command.184 
This explicitly theoretical approach to practice is immediately relevant to this 
issue on the ICC. With Bourdieu I believe that “theory must be used to recover 
the practice of the agents about which it theorizes and, in doing so, becomes 
itself a practical, engaged social activity.”185 At the same time, it is noteworthy 
that Bourdieu was averse to speaking of “praxis,” a term that he detested 
 
 182.  BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION, supra note 177, at 101. 
 183.  DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU 56 (1997). 
 184.  Id. at 142. 
 185.  Derek Robbins, Theory of Practice, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS 37 (Michael 
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because it “tends to create the impression of something pompously 
theoretical.”186 This semantic preference is suggestive of Bourdieu’s most 
important contribution to practice theory, namely the striking of a third way 
between purely nomothetic and purely ideographic modes of reasoning about 
the everyday. 
For Bourdieu, neither deduction nor induction is sufficient for making us 
comprehend the logic of practice. As he put it, “science has a time which is not 
that of practice” and “practice has a logic which is not that of the logician.”187 In 
other words, only reflexivity—another key concept that I must largely 
sidestep—can help us avoid the intellectual pitfalls that are associated with both 
metatheory and microhistory. “Practice theory is in this perspective to be 
understood as an ontological sensitivity and a set of epistemic preferences; that 
is, a way of theorizing, instead of a corpus of universally valid normative 
statements.”188 From my perspective, Bourdieu’s “general science of practices” 
is an ambitious—yet still relatively modest—theoretical framework for 
explicating how agents and structures constitute one another in everyday 
organizational life. Notwithstanding inconsistencies in his approach—and the 
conceptual confusion to which he also contributed—it is eminently helpful for 
thinking about the practice of international law because it “destabilizes the 
boundaries between general abstraction as theory and fact-finding as 
methodology.”189 At a time when the study of international law continues to be 
driven by either data or doctrine, a deliberately scientific view of practices, 
along the lines sketched by Bourdieu, holds the promise for an improved 
understanding of the reality of international law. 
In designing the issue of which this article forms a part, I have, not unlike 
Bourdieu, been cognizant of the twin dangers of what we might call, for lack of 
better terms, “excessive theorizing” and “excessive empiricizing” when it comes 
to the study of the ICC. Excessive theorizing is easily grasped. It refers to 
metatheoretical waffling about the nature of international adjudication, devoid 
of empirical grounding. This resembles Bourdieu’s methodological stance. As 
Didier Bigo writes, 
Bourdieu opposes any “social theorist” speaking about state and society in 
generalized abstract terms and avoiding the difficult empirical work of in-depth 
investigation about how many individuals or groups think or speak the same way as 
the “analyst,” and how many social universes share this so-called academic reading of 
their lives.
190
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What I call excessive empiricizing, next, refers to the production of 
nonanalytical narratives, that is, descriptions of international legal processes 
that fail to bring any form of abstract reasoning to bear. Excessive empiricizing, 
as I conceive of it, comes in two variants: “excessive doctrinalism” and 
“excessive description.” The first refers to the important, yet analytically 
sometimes very partial, accounts of technical considerations pertaining to 
international legal proceedings. The second connotes the “old institutionalist” 
tendency, alluded to in part II above, of many international legal scholars to 
merely describe the developments in international courts, usually with detailed 
reference to institutional rules and case law, without trying to theoretically and 
systematically inquire into the determinants of what I have elsewhere called 
legal contention.191 Bourdieu is a useful ally in the quest for more rigor in the 
study of international law. His practice theory is particularly helpful for our 
purposes because his concept of habitus, as Nicolini points out, 
becomes a viable alternative to the idea of organizational culture, the catch-all blanket 
concept introduced in the 1980s. Not only is habitus analytically more precise and 
convincing, it is also historically situated, open to contestation, and sensitive to power 
conflicts, all aspects that the functionalist concept of organizational culture is unable 
to capture.
192
 
Not everyone agrees. Stephen Turner, in an important challenge to 
Bourdieu’s practice theory, sought to burst the Frenchman’s bubble about the 
explanatory potential of social practices: 
The idea of ‘practice’ and its cognates has this odd kind of promissory utility. They 
promise that they can be turned into something more precise. But the value of the 
concepts is destroyed when they are pushed in the direction of meeting their promise. 
New objects—habitus instead of norms, norms instead of mores—are proposed. New 
explanatory successes, usually restricted to a small range of phenomena, occur. . . . So 
the project itself is never challenged, but it never succeeds either, at least in the way it 
would succeed if the structure of the beast [that is, the thing to be explained] were 
gradually being revealed. Instead we get, so to speak, different kinds of scans of the 
beast, each of which cannot be improved beyond a certain level of fuzziness, and each 
of which gives somewhat different and inconsistent or difficult-to-integrate pictures.
193
 
Turner’s cautionary note is well-taken. One of the challenges of developing 
methodological guidelines for the interpretive study of international law is 
precisely related to the difficult task of operationalizing fuzzy concepts derived 
from metatheory, which is why I began this article with an overview of 
conceptual similarities and differences across a number of important practice 
theorists. This limitation notwithstanding, Bourdieu’s account of the logic of 
practice is undoubtedly a major contribution. This being so, it deserves close 
scrutiny in the outline of a theory of international law as practice. Here, then, is 
the rub: 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice can be seen as an attempt to transform static, one-
dimensional views of social space into a larger differentiated, stratified, and 
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multidimensional view. By appealing to homologies existing both between habitus and 
social fields and between different social fields, Bourdieu claims to account for social 
stability, order, and reproduction. Conversely, by emphasizing both that the habitus 
allows for continuous improvisation, and that social structures, as products of history, 
contain tensions, oppositions, and contradictions, he provides for history, change, 
resistance, and social transformation.
194
 
2. De Certeau 
Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s significant contribution to theorizing the nature 
and logic of practices, critics have bemoaned the comprehensive—and 
expansive—nature of his practice theory. They have shone light on the 
totalizing tendencies that the social theorist, in their eyes, shared with another 
French sociologist, Michel Foucault. Foremost among these critics was the 
French Jesuit and interdisciplinary scholar Michel de Certeau. In his view, 
Bourdieu’s all-encompassing empirical accounts, especially of the Kabylia 
region of Algeria, where the latter conducted ethnographic fieldwork, fall 
significantly short. “Bourdieu’s texts are fascinating in their analyses and 
aggressive in their theory,” writes de Certeau.195 But Bourdieu’s argument, he 
notes, 
is concerned less to indicate . . . reality th[a]n to show its necessity and the advantages 
of his hypothesis for the theory. Thus the habitus becomes a dogmatic place, if one 
takes dogma to mean the affirmation of a “reality” which the discourse needs in order 
to be totalizing. No doubt it still has, like many dogmas, the heuristic value of 
displacing and renewing possibilities of research.
196
 
On the foundation of this critique, which de Certeau supports with ample 
evidence, he develops an alternative practice theory, albeit one that is 
considerably more modest in its ambition than Bourdieu’s, and one that zooms 
in on the mundane of everyday life, especially practices of consumption. 
Inasmuch as the mundane aspects of social behavior also play a role in other 
practice theories, notably Bourdieu’s, de Certeau brought an entirely new 
dedication to their analysis. His focus and that of his collaborators was on 
“minor practices,” as he called them: 
A society is . . . composed of certain foregrounded practices organizing its normative 
institutions and of innumerable other practices that remain “minor,” always there but 
not organizing discourses and preserving the beginnings or remains of different 
(institutional, scientific) hypotheses for that society or for others. It is in this 
multifarious and silent “reserve” of procedures that we should look for “consumer” 
practices.
197
 
Iver Neumann rightly points out that de Certeau must be considered a post-
structuralist in that he considered “the hunt for latent structures as ahistorical 
and asocial.”198 For de Certeau, social life was “contingent, not anchored in 
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something outside itself.”199 Emerging in the context of a much broader corpus 
of French scholarship on the meaning of the quotidian (everyday)—most 
notably in the writings of Henri Lefebvre, Roland Barthes, and Georges 
Perec—de Certeau’s account pushed the boundaries of practice theory in 
remarkable ways, not least by giving a novel account of action. Through his 
focus on consumption—an activity often said to be undertaken by docile 
subjects rather than tactical agents—he sought to challenge conventional 
wisdom about the determinants of everyday behavior.200 More specifically, by 
imagining consumers as “producers” in their own right, de Certeau helped 
elevate the profane to a level worthy of serious theoretical reflection. 
Furthermore, by thinking of practices in terms of “tactics,” he linked 
Foucault’s (at the time of de Certeau’s writing, rather recent) insights about 
disciplinary power to the study of practices.201 And yet, parting ways with 
Foucault, his aim was 
not to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary 
technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, 
tactical, and make-shift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of 
‘discipline.’ Pushed to their ideal limits, these procedures and ruses of consumers 
compose the network of an antidiscipline which is the subject of this book,
202
 
as he put it in The Practice of Everyday Life, the first volume of what was 
supposed to be a multivolume analysis.203 This theoretical point requires 
unpacking, because it cuts to the heart of de Certeau’s principal contribution to 
practice theory, which revolves around the conceptualization of practices as 
tactics, by which he meant “calculated action which is determined by the 
absence of a proper place.”204 Tactics, according to de Certeau, 
has no place except in that of the other. Also it must play with the terrain imposed on 
it, organized by the law of a strange force. It does not have the means of containing 
itself in itself, in a position of retreat, of anticipating, of gathering itself . . . . It profits 
from and depends upon “occasions” without a base in which to stock supplies, to 
augment a proper space, and to anticipate sorties. What it gains cannot be held. This 
non-space doubtless permits mobility, but requires amenability to the hazards of time, 
in order to seize the possibilities that a moment offers. It must vigilantly utilize the 
gaps which the particular combination of circumstances open in the control of the 
proprietary power. It poaches there. It creates surprises. It is possible for it to be 
where no one expects it.
205
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What this opaque formulation means is that the choice of tactics (as 
opposed to what de Certeau calls “strategies”) is generally the domain of agents 
who lack power, not those who possess it. “Cracks, glints, slippages, brainstorms 
within the established grids of a given system: such are the style of these tactical 
practices, which are the equivalent in the realm of action of wit and the 
witticism in the realm of language.”206 Making explicit reference to Carl von 
Clausewitz, the Prussian military strategist, de Certeau likened the practices of 
consumption to weapons of the weak.207 De Certeau’s use of the term 
“antidiscipline”208 was deliberate and programmatic in that it encapsulated his 
lifelong faith in the ability of ordinary men—and women—to evade the 
strictures of their disciplined lives, if only intermittently. From his perspective, 
everyday practices—including the seemingly innocuous practices of 
consumption—afforded otherwise marginal individuals the power to 
occasionally resist domination. He coined the term “oppositional practices” to 
capture the power that he believed attached to such “tricks of the ‘weak’” as 
“[d]welling, walking, spelling, reading, shopping, cooking,” all of which 
activities, de Certeau claimed, “present many of the characteristics of tactical 
ruses and surprises.”209 As he put it elsewhere, 
Many everyday practices (talking, reading, moving about, shopping, cooking, etc.) are 
tactical in character. And so are, more generally, many “ways of operating”: victories 
of the “weak” over the “strong” (whether the strength be that of powerful people or 
the violence of things or of an imposed order, etc.), clever tricks, knowing how to get 
away with things, “hunter’s cunning,” maneuvers, polymorphic simulations, joyful 
discoveries, poetic as well as warlike. The Greeks called these “ways of operating” 
mētis.210 
For de Certeau, then, “[t]he tactics of consumption, the ingenious ways in 
which the weak make use of the strong . . . lend a political dimension to 
everyday practices.”211 He conceived of them as artistic interventions in the 
space structurally delimited by the operation of the modes of production, which 
is why he once described them as “the most normative institutions of modern 
times.”212 But unlike other social theorists, including Bourdieu, de Certeau is 
more optimistic about the role of individual agency. As Michael Sheringham 
writes, 
For [de] Certeau, there is a glaring opposition between Bourdieu’s account of the way 
practices work in the space between subjects and systems, an account which has many 
affinities with [de] Certeau’s account of tactical play, and the way Bourdieu ultimately 
denies any freedom or control to individual subjects by his insistence on the way they 
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 211.  Id. at xvii. This is reminiscent of what the anthropologist James C. Scott, several years later, 
would famously come to call “weapons of the weak” in his study of rural resistance to formal authority 
in Malaysia. See JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT 
RESISTANCE (1985). 
 212. de Certeau, On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life, supra note 204, at 4. 
1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:29 AM 
Nos. 3 & 4 2013] THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 
act out their habitus unconsciously and passively—in ‘docta ignorantia’—Bourdieu’s 
logic of practices is based on reproduction rather than production.
213
 
The agentic focus on production is relevant to the study of practices of 
international law because it encourages us to look for tactical behavior in even 
the unlikeliest of places. As a theoretical insight, it has the potential to upend 
conventional ways of thinking about where, exactly, power is located in the 
international legal arena, who wields it, and how. De Certeau indirectly 
sensitizes scholars of IL and IR to take seriously the power of the mundane. 
This is not to say, for example, that every low-level bureaucrat in, say, an 
international court exercises power in a manner that is either noticeable or 
significant for understanding international legal outcomes, but it does suggest 
that something analytically worthwhile could be gained by ceasing to ignore the 
mundane aspects of international law. More specifically, de Certeau is 
interesting because he, unlike any other practice theorist of note, is sensitive to 
those on the margins of life. In an era in which IL and IR scholarship is 
becoming more sensitive to those on the margins of international law, de 
Certeau’s oeuvre may offer useful insights for studying these lifeworlds. 
3. Schatzki 
Schatzki, whom we already encountered, ranks among the most 
sophisticated and philosophical of contemporary practice theorists.214 In 
addition to having been at the forefront of popularizing the so-called practice 
turn in the social sciences, notably with the publication, in 2001, of the coedited 
collection The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, Schatzki has left his 
mark by vocally pushing back against the supremacy in practice theory of the 
ideas of Bourdieu and Giddens. More specifically, he has reintroduced into the 
conversation Wittgenstein’s ideas about practice. For Schatzki, Wittgenstein’s 
ideas are preferable to those developed by either Bourdieu or Giddens, notably 
because the Austrian–British philosopher did not “overintellectualize 
practices” as they are said to have done.215 
In his quest for an “anti-theoretical” position toward practice, Schatzki has 
taken particular issue with Bourdieu and Giddens because he claims they—by 
virtue of their integrated models of society emphasizing the centrality of 
structuration and habitus respectively—have smuggled objective rules into their 
theories of practice, thereby undermining the ethos of practice-based 
reasoning.216 Here is how Raymond Caldwell succinctly summarizes the most 
important of Schatzki’s critiques: 
 
 
 213.  MICHAEL SHERINGHAM, EVERYDAY LIFE: THEORIES AND PRACTICES FROM SURREALISM 
TO THE PRESENT 215 (2006). 
 214. SCHATZKI, THE SITE OF THE SOCIAL, supra note 51; see supra notes 51–58 and accompanying 
text. 
 215.  Theodore R. Schatzki, Practices and Actions: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Bourdieu and 
Giddens, 27 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 283, 285 (1997) [hereinafter Schatzki, Practices and Actions]. 
 216.  See id. at 297–300. 
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Schatzki criticizes Giddens and Bourdieu for misconceiving rule-following in an overly 
intellectual and deterministic manner. Giddens incorporates rules into his conception 
of practical consciousness as a mode of tacit knowledge that defines how actors know 
how to go on in practical situations without reference to intentionality. This idea is 
then incorporated into Giddens’s broader theory of agency and structure: rule-
following agents appear to produce and reproduce the “virtual order” of structuration. 
In contrast, Bourdieu argues that practices are not the outcome of rule-following by 
individuals, but are instead the pre-reflective enactment of various schemes of rule 
governed behaviour that occupy or reside within the “habitus” of individuals. These 
pre-reflective schemas within individual habitus cause actors to execute or carry out 
actions . . . . Schatzki objects to both of these positions because they appear to assume 
that implicit rules have objective effects in that they order social action.
217
 
This is unacceptable to Schatzki, for whom the most appealing aspect of 
practice-based reasoning is precisely the contingent nature of action, what he 
calls “the unformulability of practical understanding.”218 For example, for him 
“Bourdieu’s account (and to a lesser extent Giddens’s) too strongly portrays 
actions as proceeding out of mastery and control: knowing how to go on, the 
sense of this and that.”219 
In another respect, Schatzki’s theory of practice is noteworthy for its 
downplaying of the linguistic dimensions of practices. As he writes, 
“Intelligibility is ultimately and (one presumes) originally a practical 
phenomenon that is not entirely recouped in language.”220 This positioning was 
in part a response to the prevalence of linguistics and discourse theory in late 
twentieth-century social theory. Influenced by Wittgenstein, Schatzki rejected 
the preoccupation with language and signification. As one interpreter of 
Schatzki’s practice theory writes, “Schatzki has to keep language firmly in check 
if he is to partly justify the primacy of practice and a practice-oriented view of 
agency. If language (I speak) takes priority over practice (I do) then agency can 
dissolve into discourse, signification, talk, text or conversation.”221 
The IR scholar Iver Neumann not long ago engaged the relationship 
between practice and discourse, presumably inspired by Schatzki’s critique. Yet 
unlike the philosopher, Neumann has sought to find an analytical place for both 
discourse and practice, which he sees as standing in a dynamic relationship 
mutually constituting culture. Though he shares some of Schatzki’s discontent 
about some methodological excesses associated with the linguistic turn, 
Neumann concedes that “practice cannot be thought ‘outside of’ discourse.”222 
At the same time, he bemoans the tendency toward “armchair analysis,” by 
which he means “text-based analyses of global politics that are not 
complemented by different kinds of contextual data from the field, data that 
may illuminate how foreign policy and global politics are experienced as lived 
 
 217.  Raymond Caldwell, Reclaiming Agency, Recovering Change? An Exploration of the Practice 
Theory of Theodore Schatzki, 42 J. FOR THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 283, 293–94 (2012). 
 218.  Schatzki, Practices and Actions, supra note 215, at 300. 
 219.  Id. at 301.  
 220.  SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 128. 
 221.  Caldwell, supra note 217, at 287. 
 222.  Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn, supra note 198, at 628. 
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practices.”223 
Inasmuch as Schatzki’s critique of overemphasis on language and discourse 
in practice theory is well-taken, it remains to be seen whether his de facto 
dismissal of Bourdieu (and to a lesser extent of Giddens) will leave a mark on 
the adaptation of practice theory for the study of international law. Thus far the 
handful of IL and IR studies of international practices that currently exist have 
invoked Bourdieu’s theory of practice more than that of any other social 
theorist, notwithstanding Schatzki’s fundamental disagreement. 
4. Wenger 
Lastly, Etienne Wenger, not unlike the aforementioned Flyvbjerg with his 
project of a phronetic social science, pushed practice theory more self-
consciously in the direction of policy application. In an attempt to better 
understand—and ultimately affect—the determinants of learning in 
postmodern society, Wenger, an education specialist, began to investigate the 
social dimensions of knowledge acquisition.224 In his effort to complement 
biological, cognitive, linguistic, and other dominant theories of learning, he 
coined the evocative term “communities of practice.” The novel, and by now 
hugely influential (at least in policy circles) concept was meant to capture the 
inherently—and inescapably—collective logic of learning. “Over time,” 
according to Wenger, 
this collective learning results in practices that reflect both the pursuit of our 
enterprises and the attendant social relations. These practices are thus the property of 
a kind of community created over time by the sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise. 
It makes sense, therefore, to call these kinds of communities communities of 
practice.
225
 
For Wenger, the three defining attributes of a community of practice were 
the existence of (1) a community of mutual engagement, (2) a negotiated 
enterprise, and (3) a repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over 
time.226 The communitarian ethos (and strong policy orientation) that 
undergirds this most recent theory of practice sets it apart from the more 
critically minded practice theorists that we have encountered thus far. In this 
sense Wenger, like Flyvbjerg, has more in common with Aristotle than with 
Bourdieu or Schatzki when it comes to thinking about the logic of practices. 
Whereas Wenger and Flyvbjerg are primarily interested in making a managerial 
 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  On the policy imperative in Wenger’s work, see, for example, Etienne C. Wenger & William 
M. Snyder, Communities of Practice: The Organizational Frontier, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 
139, and, in expanded form, ETIENNE WENGER, RICHARD MCDERMOTT & WILLIAM M. SNYDER, 
CULTIVATING COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO MANAGING KNOWLEDGE (2002). For a 
tentative assessment of the concept’s salience in the policy domain, see, for example, Masoud Hemmasi 
& Carol M. Csanda, The Effectiveness of Communities of Practice: An Empirical Study, 21 J. 
MANAGERIAL ISSUES 262 (2009). 
 225.  ETIENNE WENGER, COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: LEARNING, MEANING, AND IDENTITY 45 
(1998). 
 226.  Id. at 73.  
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contribution, Bourdieu and Schatzki are more concerned with making a 
methodological one. This nontrivial difference notwithstanding, ontological 
similarities are immediately observable. Consider Wenger’s definition of 
practice, which bespeaks his intellectual debt to virtually all of the practice 
theorists who preceded him, notably to their declared objective of transcending 
the distinction between agents and structures. Though less parsimonious than 
other theories, Wenger’s amounts to an integrated compilation of salient (and 
instantly recognizable) attributes of practice: 
The concept of practice connotes doing, but not just doing in and of itself. It is doing 
in historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do. In this 
sense, practice is always social practice. Such a concept of practice includes both the 
explicit and the tacit. It includes what is said and what is left unsaid; what is 
represented and what is assumed. It includes the language, tools, documents, images, 
symbols, well-defined roles, specified criteria, codified procedures, regulations, and 
contracts that various practices make explicit for a variety of purposes.
227
 
But, says Wenger, his concept of the Backgound also includes 
all the implicit relations, tacit conventions, subtle cues, untold rules of thumb, 
recognizable intuitions, specific perceptions, well-tuned sensitivities, embodied 
understandings, underlying assumptions, and shared world views. Most of these may 
never be articulated, yet they are unmistakable signs of membership in communities 
of practice and are crucial to the success of their enterprises. Of course, the tacit is 
what we take for granted and so tends to fade into the background. If it is not 
forgotten, it tends to be relegated to the individual subconscious, to what we all know 
instinctively, to what comes naturally. But the tacit is no more individual and natural 
than what we make explicit to each other. Common sense is only commonsensical 
because it is sense held in common. Communities of practice are the prime context in 
which we can work out common sense through mutual engagement. Therefore, the 
concept of practice highlights the social and negotiated character of both the explicit 
and the tacit in our lives.
228
 
One is reminded in this context of what the philosopher John Searle, in his 
famous writings on intentionality, termed “the thesis of the Background.”229 On 
this argument, “Intentional states function only given a set of Background 
capacities that do not themselves consist in intentional phenomena.”230 What 
Searle means is that many of our everyday activities are governed by 
unconscious mental states that must be factored into explanatory accounts if we 
are serious about figuring out why we act in the ways that we do. Accordingly, 
he theorizes what he calls “Background causation” in contradistinction to 
“decision theoretic models of rationality.”231 Here is one of numerous, real-
world examples upon which Searle relies to persuade: 
Suppose I am driving to work, or suppose I am sitting in a restaurant looking at the 
menu and trying to decide what to eat. In such cases it seems implausible to say that I 
am performing a set of calculations to try to get myself on a higher indifference curve, 
 
 227.  Id. at 47. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 129 (1995) (capitalization in 
original). 
 230.  Id. at 129. 
 231.  Id. at 137–39. 
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given an antecedent set of well-ordered preferences.
232
 
 Although the practice of international law will almost always involve far 
greater levels of complexity than are commonly associated with driving and 
meal times, the overall insight applies: Not all international legal practices are 
based on deliberation or calculation. Rather, as in every other professional 
sphere, a substantial portion of everyday lawyering rests on habitual, 
routinized, ritualistic, repetitive, or mundane behavior. It is therefore plausible 
to assume that in the study of international law, as elsewhere, “a conception of 
rationality as a set of specific, well-defined operations over sharply delineated, 
explicit intentional contents is inadequate.”233 Instead, with Searle, we ought to 
want to be able to marshal accounts “that will explain the intricacy, the 
complexity, and the sensitivity of our behavior as well as explaining its 
spontaneity, creativity, and originality.”234 
Though not rejecting “intentionalistic explanation” per se, Searle carves out 
analytical space for a path right down the middle between behaviorism and 
structuralism.235 It is here that his argument about “Background” causation 
comes into play. In addition to serving other so-called functions, Searle’s 
Background facilitates linguistic interpretation, provides motivational 
dispositions, and enables the narrative (and dramatic) construction of 
experience.236 Couched in these terms, the connecting points between his 
philosophy of mind and various iterations of practice theory are remarkable 
indeed. 
Interestingly, Searle explicitly acknowledges the definitional overlap 
between the conceptual hinge of his theory of intentionality and some of the 
terms that I have herein associated with practice theory: 
My discussion of the Background is related to other discussions in contemporary 
philosophy. I think that much of Wittgenstein’s later work is about what I call the 
Background. And if I understand him correctly, Pierre Bourdieu’s important work on 
the “habitus” is about the same sort of phenomena that I call the Background. In the 
history of philosophy, I believe [David] Hume was the first philosopher to recognize 
the centrality of the Background in explaining human cognition, and Nietzsche was 
the philosopher most impressed by its radical contingency.
237
 
But let me get back to Wenger, who ultimately contributed more to practice 
theory than Searle. (Searle’s contribution was important but incidental, 
Wenger’s, integral.) Wenger developed his theory of learning by 
quadrangulating insights from what he termed theories of social structure, of 
identity, of situated experience, and of social practice, all of which, on his 
argument, are located at the intersection of four broader intellectual 
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traditions.238 As with some of the other theories of practice, the details need not 
concern us. What does bear emphasizing is Wenger’s pragmatic (in all senses of 
the word) attitude toward empirical research. As a consultant on issues of 
learning, Wenger is arguably more results-oriented than most other practice 
theorists. By this I mean that he is clearly intent on bringing about change in the 
way we learn; but he also appreciates the need to gather data in support of his 
theoretical (and normative) argument. This is useful for our purposes because 
Wenger, as a result, thinks about questions such as the operationalization of 
concepts, a methodological concern that was entirely alien to Bourdieu and 
other more critically inclined theorists of practice in the twentieth century. To 
illustrate the point, here are some of the indicators that Wenger thought helpful 
for researchers to be able to identify the existence of communities of practice: 
“sustained mutual relationships—harmonious or conflictual,” “substantial 
overlap in participants’ descriptions of who belongs,” “the ability to assess the 
appropriateness of actions and products,” “jargon and shortcuts to 
communication as well as the ease of producing new ones,” and “a shared 
discourse reflecting a certain perspective on the world.”239 
Though it is not essential, for our purposes, to know about the remaining 
seven indicators developed by Wenger, a passing familiarity with the partial list 
reproduced above is enlightening because it throws additional light on the kinds 
of things that could become “data points” (to borrow the language of 
positivism) in practice-based reasoning about international law. As such, 
Wenger, intentionally or otherwise, offers more guidance on the practical 
challenge of studying practices than some of his contemporaries. Relatedly, 
given the vagueness—or, rather, the lack of concreteness—of most existing 
conceptions of practice, the exemplary list of what might count as “the explicit” 
and “the tacit” in Wenger’s aforementioned definition fills a void. For absent 
concrete, empirical applications à la Bourdieu (think Distinction, his 
doorstopper of a book), Wenger’s all-encompassing definition goes a long way 
toward showing researchers interested in identifying, isolating, and interpreting 
practices of international law to what types of evidence to be attuned in times of 
practical immersion.240 
In this part of the article, I have placed practice theory in context, tracing its 
development from Aristotle to the present. By acquainting readers with the 
entire universe of practice theories, I have sought to present a menu of options 
for the development of practice-oriented research designs in the area of 
international law. The study of practices in international law could conceivably 
proceed on the basis of any of these theoretical articulations of practice-based 
 
 238.  These traditions are what he refers to as “theories of collectivity,” “theories of subjectivity,” 
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experience of participant observation.  
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reasoning. In the next part, I continue the contextual analysis of practice theory 
by examining its recent application in the domains of IR and of IL respectively. 
V 
THE HISTORY OF PRACTICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Taking a leaf from one or more of the aforementioned thinkers, IR and IL 
scholars in the last decade began to look for practices in the international 
system. In this part of the article, I engage with the existing scholarship, with 
particular reference to select international practices. I elucidate both the 
promise and limits of practice theory and conclude with a call for more fine-
grained research on organizational practices, which have largely, and for no 
good reason at all, escaped the practice turn in IR. 
A. Practices in International Relations 
The gradually growing literature on international practices in IR largely 
emerged out of the so-called linguistic turn in the humanities and social 
sciences. As a result of the linguistic turn, discourse analysis moved front and 
center in the interpretive study of international politics.241 It was often a method 
of first resort for constructivists intent on emphasizing the constitutive role of 
social meanings, whether they manifested themselves in the form of language, 
identity, culture, or a combination thereof.242 The fact that the vast majority of 
constructivist IR scholarship was, until very recently, not grounded in field 
research, properly understood, contributed to the centrality of discourse 
analysis in the interpretive study of international politics.243 Yet, as Neumann, 
an early advocate for careful practice-based scholarship in IR, argued more 
than a decade ago, 
in IR we have to remind ourselves that the linguistic turn and the turn to discourse 
analysis involved from the beginning a turn to practices. For IR this means the 
linguistic turn is not just a turn to narrative discourse and rhetoric, but to how politics 
is actually [a]ffected. The analysis of discourse understood as the study of the 
preconditions for social action must include the analysis of practice understood as the 
study of social action itself.
244
 
More recently, Adler and Pouliot, as already mentioned, brought together a 
number of scholars to think more systematically about select international 
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practices.245 The focus of the assembled cast was, among others, on the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a “bundle of 
interwoven practices”246 and the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS) 
as a specific practice, all of which shed light on the logic of bargaining between 
the international organization and its member states;247 on the practice, in the 
context of international bargaining, of what the rational-choice theorist William 
Riker called heresthetics, or political manipulation;248 and on the international 
practice of security privatization.249 
The turn to international practices for this handful of IR scholars, positivist 
and postpositivist alike, represents an alternative way of making sense of the 
pursuit of power politics in all of its guises and in a radically altered 
international system. Neumann, for one, by synthesizing insights from Hans 
Morgenthau—the most important representative of classical realism in IR 
theory—and Foucault, began to conceive of certain international practices as 
quintessential instruments of power, insisting that 
there does exist a rationality of government with matching principles that adds up to 
government over governments. Sovereignty may remain as an ordering principle 
among states, but the practices that constitute it are permeated not only with the 
mode of power that is sovereignty, but also with other modes of power, notably 
governmentality.
250
 
He subsequently turned to studying the practice of diplomacy to help illuminate 
the history of international practices. I will use this particular example of 
international political practice to shed light on the promise—and limits—of IR’s 
turn to practice theory. 
1. The Practice of Diplomacy 
Neumann’s application of practice theory is rather straightforward. His 
emphasis is on the empirical, not the theoretical, study of everyday life in the 
international system. In his attempt to make sense of diplomacy as “quotidian 
policy-making,” as he calls it, Neumann starts from the premise that 
international practices, generally speaking, are integrative (“they nudge social 
agents into relationships”), reflective (“they relate to the actions of others”), 
and performative (they are stylized).251 His work owes to a number of scholars 
examined in my genealogy of theories of practice, notably to de Certeau, 
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although his reliance on the Frenchman is ultimately slight.252 This does not 
mean, however, that Neumann’s contribution to the study of practices in the 
international system is negligible. Quite the contrary: What sets his writings on 
diplomacy apart from those of virtually everyone else in IR who is involved in 
the study of international practices is their empirical depth. Unlike the vast 
majority of constructivist (or otherwise critical) scholars with a pragmatic bent, 
Neumann is not content with what he calls, as already noted, “armchair 
analysis.”253 
Cognizant of constructivism’s weak empirical track record when it comes to 
tracing and substantiating such processes as socialization, Neumann delved into 
the everyday life of international politics. Wondering whether the seemingly 
anachronistic world of diplomacy still mattered in the twenty-first century, he 
set himself the task “to understand what diplomats and diplomacy do and what 
they believe they are doing.”254 In order to find out what it means, and what it 
takes, “to be a diplomat,” he chose to become one.255 Between 1997 and 1999, 
and again from 2001 until 2003, he immersed himself in Norway’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, where he worked as a planner and later as senior adviser on 
European politics.256 One impetus that persuaded him to join the diplomatic 
corps was the realization that “very little seems to be known about the standard 
operational procedures and everyday routines of diplomacy, even by many of 
those who make their living as political insiders.”257 Yet if we believe Neumann, 
“[i]t is the hands-on work of diplomats—their reports from abroad, their desk 
analyses, their drawing of all this information into recommendations for state 
policies and priorities—that make up the substance of what has for some 150 
years been known as ‘foreign’ policy making.”258 
Across a series of publications, Neumann affords us a number of terrific 
glimpses into the lifeworld of his onetime colleagues in the Norwegian foreign-
policy establishment. In keeping with the tenets of practice theory, broadly 
defined, he singles out for interpretation a number of activities that he 
considers to be constitutive of the practice of diplomacy, as experienced in 
Norway. Among them are the more obvious activities of mediation and 
negotiation as well as the kinds of activities that often remain hidden unless one 
goes inside bureaucracy, namely the activities of self-administration, textual 
production in general, and speech writing in particular.259 In his book, Neumann 
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unpacks each of these activities at great length, relying extensively on 
interviews and observations collected during his years as a participant observer. 
On the basis of a comprehensive rendering of a particular European foreign 
ministry, made around the turn of the millennium, Neumann shows that the 
organizational culture that he found in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is “highly ritualized” and self-perpetuating.260 He relates this in passing 
to Foucault’s notion of governmentality, while also observing a 
“diplomatization” of other spheres of international activity, a process that he 
suggests will have a lasting effect on the practice of diplomacy in the twenty-
first century.261 But what exactly is significant, if anything, about Neumann’s 
analysis? The question should be easy to answer, but is not: Neumann, 
apparently on account of a general disillusionment with the conventions of 
political science, largely fails to tie his findings together and relate his 
ethnographic vignettes to a clearly articulated argument about the relationship 
between diplomatic practice and international outcomes. The reader is left 
wondering whether the analytical whole that Neumann created is worth more 
than the sum of its parts. 
Compared to Neumann’s closely observed (if sometimes meandering) 
descriptions of diplomatic life in Norway, Ian Hurd’s application of practice 
theory to the study of diplomacy is refreshingly parsimonious.262 He advances a 
clearly articulated argument about the role of diplomacy in relation to 
international law on the basis of a reasonable conceptualization of diplomatic 
practice.263 On the downside, Hurd’s treatment has little to do with practice 
theory as defined here. It is one thing to bring metatheory to the empirical 
world by way of operationalization; it is quite another to elide theoretical 
complexity and sidestep what many consider the methodological essence of 
empirically motivated practice theory. For example, Hurd’s contention that 
“[a]s a social practice, diplomacy has . . . three formal qualities: sociality, 
statecentrism, and a productive effect,”264 although arguably useful in the 
context of a conventional constructivist analysis of rules and norms in the 
international system, betrays a misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of 
practice theory, as outlined in some detail above. The point of practice-based 
reasoning, in whatever theoretical incarnation, is to foreground activity, and, 
even more important, to do so in a specific time, place, and concrete historical 
context. The point is to get readers to understand, first and foremost, the 
particularity of practices. Universalizing statements about the nature of 
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diplomacy run counter to the ethos of practice theory, which as we have seen, is 
all about the discovery of social meanings.265 In the context of an analysis of the 
practice of diplomacy, close attention should be paid to the doings and sayings 
of practitioners in a localized setting of “the diplomat’s world.”266 
To be sure, my criticism here is not directed at the substance of Hurd’s 
argument about diplomacy’s role in relation to international law, but rather to 
his claim that the analysis has much to do with a practice-oriented way of 
studying international politics. Hurd’s approach, although not dissimilar from 
other recent work on international practices in IR, and although constructivist 
in orientation, is (1) not inductive, but deductive, (2) not focused on the 
patterned activities that comprise the practice of diplomacy in a specific setting, 
and (3) not founded on any observational research on the “corporeal 
knowledge” that is associated with doing. Hurd’s analysis stays at a fairly 
general level of argumentation. We do not get a sense, as we certainly do from 
Neumann due to his long-standing immersion in Norway, that diplomats are 
more than automatons. In fact, contrary to what practice theory would require, 
we learn nothing new about the meaning and logic of social action in relation to 
diplomatic practice. States are presented as unitary actors, and diplomacy as a 
phenomenon that is seemingly coherent across space and time. 
Interestingly, Pouliot’s analysis of diplomacy’s practice in the context of 
NATO’s security community suffers from similar flaws.267 Based on an empirical 
analysis of the practical logics at work in the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in 
the 1990s, Pouliot found that the dynamics of Russian–Atlantic diplomatic 
relations in the post–Cold War world were not primarily driven by the 
preexisting collective identities that had emerged on both sides in the four 
decades prior, but far more so by daily cooperation “[o]n the ground of 
international politics” between Russian and NATO security practitioners in 
such venues as the NRC.268 Although “latent mistrust of mutual intentions,”269 
not to mention problems in the “larger political relationship between Moscow 
and the West,”270 had a negative effect on the ease with which the Russian–
Atlantic relationship developed, Pouliot insists that practical knowledge is more 
important an explanatory factor than any other in accounting for the initial 
opening toward the Western alliance that was observable in Russia’s diplomatic 
circles as well as for the limits of this rapprochement,271 notably at the moment 
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when NATO embarked on its policy of double enlargement. This latter policy 
had the effect of complicating international security in practice and ultimately 
reversing the nature of diplomatic relations between the Western alliance and 
Russia from tentative cooperation back to outright confrontation.272 Leaving 
aside the veracity of the empirical argument, which challenges much of the 
conventional wisdom, Pouliot challenges a core assumption of constructivist 
reasoning in IR, namely the claim that identities drive behavior: 
[I]t is not only who we are that drives what we do; it is also what we do that determines 
who we are. By starting with the concrete ways in which state representatives handle 
disputes in and through practice, I reverse the traditional causal arrow of social 
action—from ideas to practice—and emphasize how practices also shape the world 
and its meaning.
273
 
He has certainly done so, and his book illustrates well, in certain respects at 
least, the explanatory power of a practice-based approach. But the book also 
has limits. 
Aside from the obvious criticism that the NRC was responsible for enacting 
only a small slice of NATO–Russian diplomacy, it is surprising that Pouliot 
reveals very little about the daily grind at the NRC. As one critic noted, 
Pouliot might . . . have devoted more attention to the specific practices of the security 
professionals he interviewed. His interviewees are identified in only the vaguest of 
terms and there is relatively little discussion either of their day to day experiences or 
of their precise role within the policy-making process. . . . Pouliot’s argument that 
international security emerges “in and through practice” would be more persuasive 
had he provided a detailed analysis of the precise role played by his “security 
professionals” within the machinery of foreign and security policy-making. It is 
conceivable that the way diplomatic and military officials at the coal face of 
international relations represent issues and frame policy options plays a vital role in 
shaping the parameters of high policy. To make this argument, however, requires a 
carefully considered analysis of the various policy-making fields under consideration. 
The book does not do this and the argument is less persuasive than it might have been 
as a result.
274
 
Like Hurd, Pouliot is chiefly interested in the macrodimensions of 
diplomacy rather than in the microdimensions thereof, which is unfortunate, for 
as Neumann has shown, a lot can be gleaned about what it diplomacy is, and is 
not, by working from the inside out. Although Pouliot conducted several dozen 
interviews in capitals around the world, this is not quite the same as getting an 
unvarnished look at the interior of the lifeworld of those with whom he is 
concerned—diplomats. The point is an important one, of great methodological 
significance, because, if we are serious about the study of practice, we must be 
careful not to mistake representations of practice for the real thing. In this 
context, one reviewer of Pouliot’s book made the important point that the 
measured responses from NATO and Russian diplomats on the question of the 
use of force that Pouliot takes as evidence of a diplomatic rapprochement may 
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not be as genuine as the latter thinks: 
On one level, all of this could be interpreted as compelling evidence that the use of 
force has indeed disappeared from the conceptual horizons of policy elites. Yet it 
might also be argued that diplomats are always likely to give the kind of measured and 
reassuring responses that Pouliot quotes. This is the way members of the diplomatic 
profession are trained to express themselves (particularly to outsiders). There are 
good reasons for this. Recourse to the language of force necessarily limits the scope 
for negotiation and compromise. Introducing military considerations into discussions 
of political relations, moreover, tends to increase the influence of soldiers at the 
expense of diplomats. Stressing the potential of negotiations, conversely, protects the 
space for diplomatic manoeuvre. The use of measured language and an emphasis on 
the need for conversation is therefore a pivotal disposition in the habitus of the 
professional diplomat. . . . [D]iplomatic professionals tend to avoid overt references to 
the need for military options, not least because their influence tends to diminish 
dramatically once this threshold has been crossed. Some consideration of this issue 
might have added greater nuance to Pouliot’s analysis of his interview data.
275
 
A different way of putting this is to say that Pouliot might have benefitted from 
complementing his conventional qualitative methodology of choice—
interviews—with a more unconventional one—namely participant observation. 
Even if done sparingly, immersion trumps standing on the outside looking in, 
especially if it is the daily work of diplomacy one hopes to study. With this 
background in mind, Neumann’s genuinely ethnographic approach to studying 
a most salient practice of international politics, and his concerted effort to 
understand the many concrete (and often mundane) work activities at the heart 
of diplomatic work, despite shortcomings, some of which I have detailed above, 
has brought us considerably closer to what we can reasonably expect to achieve 
from making practice theory usable for the study of the international system. 
B. Practices in International Law 
In the study of international law, practice theory has not yet left much of a 
mark. Dezalay and Garth, as mentioned, have brought Bourdieu to the study of 
international law, but the application of the sociologist’s oeuvre in their books 
and articles revolved more around his field theory than his writings on practice. 
This being so, the IL landscape is rather barren of practice-oriented analyses. It 
is therefore worthwhile to consider an example of leading scholarship that has 
singled out patterned activity for a practice-oriented analysis of international 
law. An international practice upon which I rely to exemplify the promise—and 
limits—of IL’s turn to practice theory is that of legality, as analyzed by the legal 
scholar Jutta Brunnée and the political scientist Stephen Toope, whose book, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, won the 2011 Certificate of Merit 
of the American Society of International Law “for a preeminent contribution to 
creative scholarship.”276 Next, I showcase important work on organizational 
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practices, as I conceive of them, coming out of IL. Among the very few scholars 
who have embarked on genuinely ethnographic work is Galit Sarfaty, who, in a 
handful of publications, notably in her book Values in Translation: Human 
Rights and the Culture of the World Bank, has unearthed, both comprehensively 
and in a very specific context, important insights about the everyday practice of 
human rights.277 
1. The Practice of Legality 
As part of the aforementioned project on international practices, Brunnée 
and Toope sought to come to terms with the phenomenon of legal obligation in 
international law, which, on their account, requires us to move beyond 
conventional reasoning in IL, especially in the context of global climate change 
with which Brunnée and Toope are particularly concerned. As they write, 
“[R]ather than simply treating state practice as behavioral regularities, or as the 
day-to-day application of a pre-existing construct called ‘law,’ we posit that a 
distinctive practice of legality is required for law, and legal obligation, to exist 
and to be sustained over time.”278 In order to answer the question of why states 
obey international law, maintain Brunnée and Toope, scholars ought to pursue 
a technical analysis of formal sources of international law alongside an 
interpretive analysis of the interactions between and among states that make, 
remake, or unmake international law. On their argument, “[t]he hard work of 
international law is never done—legal obligation must be built and continuously 
reinforced by communities of legal practice.”279 
The term “communities of practice,” as we have seen, is Etienne Wenger’s. 
Brunnée and Toope do not spend much time operationalizing the concept for 
their purpose. In fact, their analysis of the international practice of legality is 
more conventionally constructivist in focus than practice-oriented. Drawing on 
the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller, notably his work on the so-called inner 
morality of law, they argue that governments’ sustained adherence, in their 
international legal dealings, to Fuller’s criteria of legality,280 will persuade those 
governments to habitually obey international law: 
Fidelity is generated and, in our terminology obligation is felt, because adherence to 
the eight criteria of legality in the creation of norms and in their continuing 
application (a ‘practice of legality’) produce law that is legitimate in the eyes of the 
persons to whom it is addressed. Legal obligation, then, is best viewed as an 
internalized commitment and not as an externally imposed duty matched with a 
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sanction for non-performance.
281
 
The internalized commitment is created and maintained by the continued 
performance of shared understandings of what constitutes appropriate legal 
norms and institutions, internationally and otherwise. 
On this foundation, Brunnée and Toope advance the interesting claim that 
“it is possible for communities of legal practice to emerge in the absence of 
strongly shared substantive values, on the basis only of a shared commitment to 
the enterprise of legal interaction.”282 I find this theoretical argument eminently 
plausible, not least because I advanced a very similar claim—though without 
reference to practice theory—about the institutional effects of legality in a 
domestic context.283 This notwithstanding, I think conspicuously lacking from 
the analysis is an explicit engagement—both theoretical and empirical—with 
the concrete patterned activities that constitute the practice of legality. The 
authors lean too much on their “interactional law framework,” which, though 
innovative, leaves the reader wanting to hear more about the everyday life of 
legality in international law than about the broad-strokes argument that fidelity 
to international law is contingent on reciprocity, which, in turn, “is created and 
maintained collectively through continuing practice.”284 Put differently, the 
account offered by Brunnée and Toope is insufficiently specific about the 
mechanisms and processes of community building, that is, about what exactly is 
involved when legality is being practiced in the international system. 
Therefore, inasmuch as the theoretical argument, rooted in an application of 
Fulller’s procedural concept of law to the international stage, is compelling, its 
incorporation of practice theory is less convincing. Although the empirical 
analysis of the global climate regime,285 which they undertake in both the book 
and the chapter at issue here, is illuminating, it is more conventionally 
constructivist in nature than reminiscent of a sophisticated analysis of practice. 
They show, though not exhaustively, that the strong procedural elements of the 
recurring climate-change negotiations, combined with a steady supply of law-
minded government representatives, “has helped generate a sense of 
commitment of the participants to the climate regime and accounts at least in 
part for its resilience.”286 Although this may be so, a genuinely practice-based 
analysis would have pushed harder to acquaint us in substantially more detail 
with the everyday life of legality’s practice in Kyoto, Copenhagen, and the 
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many other sites of international bargaining. For as we have seen, practice 
theorists, regardless of theoretical persuasion, foreground the importance of 
activity, performance, and work in the creation of social phenomena. This 
attention to the minutiae of legality’s practice in the international system is, 
unfortunately, missing from Brunnée and Toope’s work. It could be relatively 
easily incorporated, however, especially if the authors embarked on 
observational research in the world of international environmental law. Such a 
turn to up-close and personal inquiry inside some of the domestic and 
international institutions that comprise the international environmental regime 
would enable scholars to know with more certainty how legal ideas truly move 
in the international system. It would allow for a more careful—and concrete—
tracing of the mechanisms involved in the socialization of states.287 For as IR 
scholars such as Alastair Iain Johnston have pointed out, we still know very 
little about the microfoundations of socialization in the international system.288 
What remains interesting about Brunnée and Toope’s application, if 
imperfect, of practice theory to an important topic in the study of international 
law—legal obligation—is their contribution to our understanding of a 
perennially challenging construct of public international law, namely the 
concept of opinio juris, famously defined by the International Court of Justice 
as the “belief that [a] practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
of law requiring it.”289 Though their method and argument can be challenged in 
multiple ways, what they do indeed provide is, as they put it, “a more objective, 
less mystical, account of how customary legal norms become binding.”290 By 
offering a constructivist—rather than rationalist—perspective on legal 
obligation, Brunnée and Toope give more substantive meaning to the 
international legal requirement of opinio juris. They do so by providing a 
theoretically plausible and empirically verifiable account of how, and why, 
states may feel the pull of international law qua law. By linking legal obligation 
to the identity of states, not just their interests, as well as to the institutions of 
international life, Brunnée and Toope manage to render less mysterious the 
concept of opinio juris and its operation in international law. If practice theory, 
even without field research, has the ability to help us illuminate the empirical 
(as opposed to the doctrinal) logic of one of the principal tenets of international 
law, it is not unreasonable to expect that a fair amount could be gained by 
applying insights from any of the many theories of practice also to other 
international legal questions of importance. 
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2. The Practice of Human Rights 
As already mentioned, Sarfaty has made a valuable contribution to 
understanding the practical dimensions of international law by way of her in-
depth treatment of one important collective actor in this realm—the World 
Bank. Relevant to IL scholarship on international law, the international 
financial institution in Washington, D.C. proves an ideal setting in which to 
explore what I have elsewhere called the logic of legal contention. Sarfaty 
initially demonstrates that, and why, human rights are of marginal significance 
in the daily work of the World Bank. That finding, however, at the aggregate 
level at least, is neither surprising nor new. Far more important then is Sarfaty’s 
account of the various mechanisms and processes by which human rights have 
been marginalized at the World Bank, and the temporal dimension of what 
Sarfaty says amounts to a cultural logic of marginalization. As she puts it, 
I demonstrate that human rights has been a taboo topic within parts of the institution, 
but the type and extent of the taboo has changed over time and in different contexts. 
Moreover, when the concept of human rights has been incorporated into Bank 
discourses and practices, it has often been in a partial or inconsistent manner.
291
 
Studying shifting patterns of marginalization and changes in type and extent is 
not easy. It is a sensitive, time-consuming, and methodologically challenging 
proposition for any researcher. A practice-based approach is well-suited to the 
task because it foregrounds the importance of interpreting work activity, of 
doing. Though she does not ground herself theoretically or methodologically in 
any theory of practice, Sarfaty comes close to embodying the approach in her 
work on the World Bank. 
Intrigued by the question of why the World Bank, despite the increased 
salience of human-rights concerns on the part of other international 
organizations involved in poverty reduction and fostering development—from 
the United Nations Development Programme to the United Nations Children’s 
Fund—has not adopted a deliberate and integrated human-rights strategy, 
Sarfaty began to look for answers in IL scholarship. To her chagrin, “[t]his 
literature primarily focuses on legal arguments for binding the Bank and its 
member countries to international human rights obligations. It does not 
investigate the internal workings of the bureaucracy so as to understand why 
the Bank has yet to adopt and internalize human rights norms.”292 Sarfaty’s 
dissatisfaction with IL scholarship mirrors my own: The conventional and 
widespread disregard in the discipline for studying the microfoundations of IL 
developments has had the unfortunate effect of rendering international legal 
scholarship unable to address—theoretically, methodologically, and 
empirically—the question that Sarfaty posed: Why is the World Bank not 
serious about human rights? 
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Although it is not inaccurate to suggest that “the” World Bank is not serious 
about human rights, this statement conceals more than it reveals. For Sarfaty’s 
research makes plain that a number of committed World Bank employees have 
been pushing the human-rights agenda inside the organization for almost two 
decades, ever since James Wolfensohn became president of the Bank in 1995, 
and with particular vigor from 2002 onward, following the creation of an 
organization-wide task force on human rights. However, without going into 
much detail, these high-level initiatives achieved little. Human rights are hardly 
less marginal now than before Wolfensohn’s tenure. Conventional IL 
scholarship is unable to explain this rather unexpected outcome. After all, as we 
have seen, other international organizations appear to have embraced, even 
internalized, legal human-rights norms and institutions. If we believe Sarfaty, 
the only way to understand the “marginality,” as she terms it, of human rights at 
the World Bank is to stop treating the Washington-based bureaucracy as if it 
were a unitary actor. Similarly to the proposals I have articulated in this article, 
Sarfaty believes in the importance of opening the “black box” of international 
organizations, be they international financial institutions or international 
criminal courts and tribunals: 
I have found that the ways norms become adopted and ultimately internalized in an 
institution largely depend on their fit with the organizational culture. When a new 
norm is introduced, employees from different professional groups within the Bank 
often have distinct interpretive frames that they use to define the norm, analyze its 
relevance to the Bank’s mission, and apply it in practice. Proponents of a norm must 
take internal conflict over competing frames into account when trying to persuade 
staff members to accept it. They must also consider the operational procedures, 
incentive system, and management structure of the organization when determining the 
most effective strategy of implementation. Thus, to bring about internalization, actors 
must adapt norms to local meanings and existing cultural values and practices—that is, 
they must “vernacularize” norms.
293
 
Sarfaty knows all of this because practice theorists, especially those who 
have been studying organizational dynamics, have been saying as much for 
years. But then again Sarfaty also knows her way around the World Bank 
because of her ethnographic immersion there. In addition to knowing things 
about bureaucracy in general, she saw fit to learn something about bureaucracy 
in particular, and to do so concretely, as a participant observer. It is this 
experience, the partaking in the everyday life of the World Bank, that has 
sensitized her to the peculiar logic of contentious politics surrounding the 
persistent nonadoption of human-rights norms over the course of two decades. 
Absent this, she would neither have been privy to, nor recognized the causal 
significance of, the “battles between Bank lawyers and economists over 
defining human rights norms.”294 For it turns out that, more than anything, it 
was “a clash of expertise,” coupled with irreconcilable ways of seeing the world, 
that caused—and allowed—economists to outmaneuver the comparatively 
small number of lawyers intent on reconfiguring World Bank strategy. As 
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Sarfaty writes, “The dominant subculture within the organization consists of 
economists because their expertise is considered the most valuable to the 
Bank’s core work of promoting poverty reduction and economic growth.”295 
Economists, in other words, were victorious when it came to marginalizing 
human rights at the World Bank because the organizational culture of the 
international financial institution considers arguments from international law to 
be alien to the practice of international development as understood at the 
World Bank. Lawyers, one might say, have been treated as “the other” at the 
World Bank. 
Needless to say, the story that Sarfaty tells is more nuanced and worth 
reading in full. More relevant for the purpose of this article than her substantive 
findings, however, is her participation in, and close reading of, all kinds of daily 
goings-on inside the World Bank bureaucracy. It is worth including verbatim 
her summary of the methodological approach that she took in researching the 
social meanings of human rights at the World Bank not only because her 
approach is broadly in line with my guidelines for studying the practice of 
international law, which I elaborate in part VI, but also because the description 
she offers might aid future researchers in deciding whether or not deeply 
interpretive field research on the practice of international law is feasible for 
them—whether financially, intellectually, or in terms of the substantial time 
commitment that is required. Here, then, is Sarfaty with details about her 
ethnographic study of the World Bank: 
As part of the research for my doctoral dissertation in anthropology, I worked and 
conducted fieldwork at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., for 
approximately two years over a period of four years, from 2002 to 2006. During the 
summers of 2002 and 2004, I served as a consultant and intern in the Legal 
Department and the Social Development and Environment Departments of the Latin 
America and Caribbean Region. My two summers as an intern afforded me the trust 
to gain access for a full year of fieldwork, from September 2005 until July 2006. . . . My 
methods included interviews with more than seventy staff members (from project 
manager to a former president), executive directors, U.S. Treasury officials, and NGO 
representatives; participation at Bank training sessions and seminars; and analyses of 
Bank projects and documents. . . . Conducting ethnographic research on the Bank 
enabled me to uncover the formal and informal norms and the decision-making 
processes within the institution that shape state behavior. I examined the institution 
from both the top down and the bottom up, focusing not only on its leadership and 
administrative structure, but also on the tasks and incentives of the staff. I analyzed 
the informal practices and unspoken assumptions held by employees that may be 
misinterpreted by or hidden from external observers, as well as the employees 
themselves. The application of these techniques reveals the competing subcultures and 
other internal contestations that may impede norm internalization.
296
 
The duration of Sarfaty’s ethnographic immersion at the World Bank was in 
keeping with professional anthropological standards. From the vantage point of 
IL and IR, where ethnographic research is the exception, her time spent 
working alongside the World Bank’s economists and lawyers looks even more 
impressive. However, given the dearth of analytical—rather than merely 
 
 295.  Id. at 673. 
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descriptive—accounts of international legal settings, any carefully planned 
immersion will likely contribute to our knowledge about how international law 
works in practice. Not every excursion into the field to make sense of the 
everyday life of international law need necessarily last years, as Sarfaty’s did. 
Much can be gleaned, especially by an experienced field researcher, from 
considerably shorter stints inside the many bureaucracies attending, in whole or 
in part, to questions of international law. The only thing that could have 
improved Sarfaty’s otherwise flawless research design is a theoretical 
engagement not only with the sizable literature on socialization, which she 
touches upon in passing, but with one or more of the many theories of practice 
that can be made usable for the study of international law, at the World Bank 
and elsewhere. 
So much for the practice of human rights as an organizational practice. Of 
course, the practice of human rights can also be fruitfully studied as an 
international practice, by which I mean a practice that is not primarily enacted 
inside one bureaucratic entity, but rather on the stage of the international 
system as a whole, with a multitude of international agents playing a role—from 
individuals to NGOs to states to international organizations. The sociologist 
Fuyuki Kurasawa, for example, recently relied on insights from practice theory 
to understand the “social labor” involved in the making of five transnational 
forms of advocacy in pursuit of human rights—namely, bearing witness, 
forgiveness, foresight, aid, and solidarity.297 On Kurasawa’s argument, these five 
international practices are jointly constitutive of what he calls the work of 
global justice, by which he means the entire universe of struggles on behalf of 
progressive goals, from the campaign to end of poverty to the fight against 
impunity. Global justice is theorized as a “constellation of practices,” held 
together by social glue made from intersubjectivity, publicity, and 
transnationalism.298 Kurasawa’s analytical goal is to specify the everyday “work” 
that the task of “realizing utopia,” to borrow a phrase from the late Antonio 
Cassese, requires.299 Kurasawa asks readers to appreciate the limits of purely 
formalist understandings of human rights—which dominate the field of IL—and 
to embrace in their stead 
a substantive conception of human rights, whereby the latter function as more than 
ontological attributes which we enjoy as members of humankind or entitlements that 
are legislated on our behalf by states or international organizations; they are, just as 
significantly, capacities that groups and persons produce, activate and must exercise 
by pursuing ethico-political labour.
300
 
The work of global justice, finds Kurosawa, is “perpetually difficult, even 
 
 297.  FUYUKI KURASAWA, THE WORK OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AS PRACTICES 16–
17 (2007).   
 298.  Id. at 18. 
 299.  See generally REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Antonio Cassese 
ed., 2012).  
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flawed and aporetic.”301 Because most human-rights practitioners would readily 
agree, what does practice theory have to offer that we do not already know? 
A practice-based analysis of human rights, properly understood, has the 
advantage of transcending mere description. Rather than elevating anecdote to 
the level of fact, locally situated analyses of human-rights work, when grounded 
in eye-level research, make visible previously unknown connections as well as 
pathways of both power and pathology. This is possible because modes of 
practice are “the lynchpins of the work of global justice, the points of contact, 
transmission and mutual influence between national and global institutions 
(transnational corporations, states, international organizations, etc.), at one 
level, and civil society struggles (protests, public claims and campaigns, 
demands for prosecution, etc.), at the other.”302 Although Kurosawa’s 
scholarship is undergirded, rather problematically from an analytical 
perspective, with a normative belief in the desirability of all work on behalf of 
global justice, he does succeed in looking at human rights not in the abstract but 
in everyday life.303 
This brief review of a number of representative, if eclectic, contributions to 
the existing literature on practices in IR and IL was designed to convey three 
things: (1) practice-oriented scholarship on developments in the international 
system is gradually growing, (2) the exploration of all kinds of topics of 
international significance can potentially benefit from practice-based reasoning, 
and (3) several research designs in IR and IL claiming to be practice-based are 
less theoretically sophisticated, methodologically rigorous, and empirically 
grounded than one would expect based on the intellectual foundations on which 
they were erected. 
VI 
METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE STUDY OF PRACTICES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Having explored in some depth the theory and history of practices, I am 
now in a position to draw on this intellectual tradition to develop guidelines for 
the relational study of international law. By making insights about the logic of 
practices usable for the study of international criminal law in particular, I hope 
to provide an impetus for more rigorously descriptive work in international law, 
by which I mean theoretically driven interpretive work that is firmly grounded 
in really existing locations of international law.304 To the extent that I have 
 
 301.  Id. at 15. 
 302.  Id. at 197. 
 303.  As evidence of Kurosawa’s normative belief, and thus of his potentially diminished capacity 
for analytical judgment, consider this statement, one of many in defense of his particular brand of 
cosmopolitanism: “[T]he performance of modes of practice of global justice would help to foster an 
alternative world order based on principles of participatory democracy and oversight, as well as a major 
North–South and domestic redistribution of symbolic and material resources.” Id. at 198.     
 304.  On the question of “locations” in field research, see ANTHROPOLOGICAL LOCATIONS: 
BOUNDARIES AND GROUNDS OF A FIELD SCIENCE (Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson eds., 1997) 
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emphasized in this article the importance of detecting the social meaning(s) of 
international law, mine is ultimately an argument for integrating aspects of 
rationalism and doctrinalism and interpretivism in the study of international 
legal phenomena. It goes without saying that many agents acting on the world 
of international law will on many occasions make decisions in response to a 
calculation of means and ends. It is also fairly obvious, at least to anyone who 
knows the practice of international law from the inside, that the norms and 
values undergirding international legal doctrine constitute behavior. Yet only 
by closely observing goings-on in really existing locations of international law 
do we stand to gain a “sobjectivist” sense of the nature and salience of the law-
crafts, what I have begun to theorize in this article as the practice of 
international law. On my argument, the reality of international law is not 
represented, at least not fully, by the macroprocesses of international legal 
transactions (as in the doctrine of “state practice”). Nor is it fully captured by 
instrumentalist accounts of microprocesses. Rather, the ontological essence of 
international law reveals itself only if, and when, we integrate knowledge about 
both the representational and nonrepresentational aspects of this vexing of 
international phenomena. For as I have argued elsewhere, international law, 
like international politics, is what actors make of it.305 
Accordingly, in this part of the article I am concerned with the future of 
practice-based research on international law. I make a particular case for the 
interpretive study of practices in international law. Needless to say, the 
interpretive pursuit thereof is but one of several ways to advance the study of 
practices in international law. As Stern reminds us, “Taking practices as a point 
of departure does not require a commitment to any particular method, or any 
specific destination.”306 I single out interpretive methodology because it is so 
rarely adopted in the study of international law yet uniquely suited to help 
researchers meet the two minimum requirements of all practice-oriented work 
discussed above: a commitment to holism about meaning and the willingness to 
pay close attention to particular practices and the specific contexts in which 
they are performed. The methodology is particularly helpful for the study of the 
ICC and comparable international organizations. 
My discussion revolves around concrete strategies of inquiry that promise to 
improve the identification, investigation, and interpretation of practices. Before 
I turn to my methodological prescriptions, it is useful to briefly differentiate the 
logic of practices from the two other major logics of social action, namely the 
 
(proposing “a reformulation of the anthropological fieldwork tradition that would decenter and 
defetishize the concept of ‘the field,’ while developing methodological and epistemological strategies 
that foreground questions of location, intervention, and the construction of situated knowledges”). 
 305.  Jens Meierhenrich, International Law Is What States Make of It, Paper Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (April 3, 2013) (on file with author); see also 
Jens Meierhenrich, Explaining and Understanding Compliance with International Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffmann eds., 
forthcoming 2014).  
 306.  Stern, supra note 34, at 186. 
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so-called logic of consequences and what is known as the logic of 
appropriateness. Figure 1 offers a depiction of these logics, which, per the visual 
rendering, should be thought of in real life as interdependent, though usually 
are not. Any serious student of the social sciences will be intimately familiar 
with the latter two perspectives on why agents, individual or collective, choose 
to act on the world. First explicitly theorized in 1989 by James March and Johan 
Olsen, the logic of consequences, on the one hand, and the logic of 
appropriateness, on the other, draw attention to two rival accounts of the 
determinants of choices about action.307 Arguments from the logic of 
consequences, regardless of the substantive question or topic at hand, posit that 
agents opt to behave in a particular way in response to the expected 
consequences of their actions, which they calculate prior to taking action. On 
this logic, social behavior is driven, first and foremost, by considerations about 
means and ends. Rationality and interests are taken to be central motivating 
factors. Arguments from the logic of appropriateness, by contrast, hold that 
agents act in response to very different stimuli. The stimuli are often expressed 
in terms of the social force of obligation. On this second logic, social behavior is 
driven, first and foremost, by considerations about norms and values. Emotion 
and identity are thought to be the principal motivating factors. In IR and IL 
scholarship, arguments from the logic of consequences are widespread in 
rationalist explanations of international phenomena. Arguments from the logic 
of appropriateness are commonplace in constructivist scholarship. 
 
Figure 1: The Logics of Social Action 
 
As I have explained throughout this article, the logic of practices, regardless 
of its specific theoretical articulation, departs radically and fundamentally from 
 
 307.  See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989).For an application to the international system, see 
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 
INT’L ORG. 943 (1998). 
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both of the aforementioned logics of social action. 
The logic of practice jettisons the idea that agents take decisions, or can be treated ‘as 
if’ they take decisions, in such a reflexive, logical, and analytical way. . . . This practice-
based logic of action is offered to compliment, rather than to replace, existing theories, 
which hold that agents engage in conscious deliberation about consequences and/or 
obligations.
308
 
Given this significance of practice theory—as a unique methodology that seeks 
to come to terms with an increasingly popular way of seeing the world—the 
interpretive turn that I am hoping to help advance with this article is opportune 
for the study of international law. Whereas the logic of expected consequences 
leads us to derive actions from preferences and the logic of appropriateness 
leads us to derive actions from identities, the logic of practices—although 
analytically mindful of the roles of both rationality and emotion—tells us to 
start our account of actions with actions, the assumption being that the 
unselfconscious doings of specific individuals in “particular circumstances” 
(Aristotle’s concept) are not always reducible to either preferences or identities 
and may even be ontologically prior to both.309 
I should note, in an aside, that Pouliot, like many other IR theorists drawing 
on Thomas Risse’s argument to this effect,310 includes the logic of 
communicative action as a fourth logic of social action.311 I depart from this 
depiction, sticking with a tripartite distinction. I propose that communicative 
action, depending on its empirical manifestation, usually combines elements 
from each of the three logics of social action. I would make a similar claim for 
the “logic of habit” that Ted Hopf endeavored to distinguish from the logic of 
practices.312 Inasmuch as I find important and convincing Hopf’s conceptual 
distinction between habits and practices, I am not persuaded that the two forms 
of behavior represent two fundamentally different logics of social action. It 
seems to me that both are part and parcel of an understanding of social action 
rooted in the “automatic system” of the brain, that is, in the unreflective nether 
regions of being.313 Or, as Bourdieu put it, individuals who embody practices do 
so “without entering consciousness except in an intermittent and partial way.”314 
If we accept this to be so, it does not make sense to conceive of habits and 
practices as contending logics of social action but rather as two sides of the 
same behavioral coin—namely as more (in the case of practices) or less (in the 
case of habits) agentic forms of nonreflective participation in social life, 
 
 308.  David Jason Karp, The Location of International Practices: What Is Human Rights Practice?, 
39 REV. INT’L STUD. 969, 974 (2013). 
 309.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 122, at l. 1141b. 
 310.  See generally Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 1 (2000). 
 311.  Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality, supra note 22, at 276.  
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whether local, national, or international in character. Be that as it may, how 
should students of international law study practices if they feel so inclined? 
Taking a leaf from Flyvbjerg who, over a decade ago, devoted his career to 
“making social science matter,” as he put it,315 I advance five concrete guidelines 
for studying practices in international law in a theoretically meaningful way. I 
propose that any practice-oriented researcher with serious empirical ambitions 
ought to (1) overcome distance, (2) locate reality, (3) identify activity, (4) reveal 
meaning, and (5) investigate context. 
A. Overcome Distance 
This first methodological guideline, as straightforward as it is, is perhaps the 
hardest to follow. Any scholar of international law who is seriously interested in 
understanding how international law works in practice (as opposed to merely in 
theory) ought to leave his or her office once in a while and take a look—up, 
close, and personally—at what goes on in the many different international 
courts, government ministries, organizations, law firms, and other settings in 
which scores of individuals participate on a daily basis in, among other things, 
the making, breaking, and honoring of international law. All kinds of 
immersion scenarios are conceivable, from extended internships, to clerkships, 
to sabbaticals. Oftentimes what we find at the microlevel in such settings may 
accord in broad outline with what we or others have theorized at the 
macrolevel. At other times, however—and this is certainly true of what my 
research over the last few years on the ICC has shown—the existing literature 
on international law has but a partial, incomplete, and even distorted sense of 
the everyday life of international law. Even where this is not the case, a focus 
on the micropolitics of international law will, at a minimum, generate more 
fine-grained empirical observations than can be collected from hundreds or 
thousands of miles away or by way of what, not infrequently, are crude 
quantitative indicators.316 
What is more, by overcoming the distance, both literally and figuratively, 
between ourselves and the sites of international law that we study, the potential 
for more sophisticated (in terms of rendering more complexity visible rather 
than less) scholarship increases. The academic analyses that result may be 
considerably messier and less parsimonious than some social scientists desire, 
but it stands to reason that scholarship founded on, or at least informed by, a 
genuine immersion in the world of international law, and a self-conscious 
engagement with its practitioners, has the potential of making the study of 
international law matter more than it otherwise would. By bringing everyday 
 
 315.  See FLYVBJERG, supra note 126, at 129–40 (crafting “Methodological Guidelines for a 
Reformed Social Science”). 
 316.  For pioneering work on the limitations of measurement in the study of international legal 
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1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:29 AM 
72 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:1 
agents of international law, and their lifeworlds, concretely into view, the 
interpretive study of international legal practices opens up a black box that 
scholars have peered into far too infrequently. Indeed, the reduction of 
distance, my first methodological guideline, is likely a sine qua non of any 
sustainable bridge-building between the “law-crafts” and those who study them 
from inside their university offices, whether they are IL or IR scholars or in 
another discipline entirely.317 
B. Locate Reality 
Overcoming distance alone, however, is not enough in the study of practices 
in international law. Mere participant observation, without analytical training 
and ingenuity or a carefully rendered research design, will not result in 
advanced scholarship on international law. It is important to know where to 
look. For practices, as Nicolini writes, “cannot be understood without reference 
to a specific place, time, and concrete historical context.”318 In short, it is 
important to locate the reality of international law. This slightly vague 
formulation is meant to highlight the importance of carefully reflecting on site 
selection, that is, choosing the research setting most likely to be analytically 
useful for an extended immersion in the name of interpretive research on a 
given research question pertaining to international law. Although the operation 
of international law can be closely observed in hundreds of settings, not all 
locations are equally valuable from an analytical standpoint. This being so, 
sound interpretive research on practices in international law requires a lot of 
preparatory work. Because ethnographic research is time and resource 
intensive, it demands a solid understanding, prior to the beginning of principal 
field research, of where an extended immersion promises to generate the 
highest observational payoffs. This requires a good preliminary sense of where 
the international legal action is, or where the reality to be understood can be 
observed most fully. 
A practice-oriented approach will often benefit from decentering. A 
decentered perspective to the study of international law can either involve the 
selection of an analytically interesting and unusual site or the application of an 
unusual theoretical approach to a prominent site. Either way, the chosen site 
must also be capable of producing a sufficient number of observable—and 
relevant—processes related to the substantive question about international 
legal practices that is at stake in the research design. Not every closely observed 
study of international law’s practice will be automatically worthwhile. It will be 
compelling only to the extent that it is revealing of new or unexpected insights 
about the international legal order. It is for this reason that any practice-
oriented researcher of international law should come with a preliminary sense 
 
 317.  In recent years anthropologists have begun to discover the study of international law. 
Unfortunately, and surprisingly, most of the existing anthropological literature is insufficiently 
empirical, by which I mean founded on participant observation.  
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of where the reality of international law can best be studied in her area of 
specialization. This in turn demands a fairly sophisticated grasp of operational 
knowledge so as to avoid spending time and effort immersed in an 
analytically—because practically—marginal research site. Usually, the kind of 
operational wherewithal that I am speaking of is impossible to acquire from 
secondary scholarship on international law, the majority of which does not, as 
mentioned, concern itself with the kinds of textured analyses on which 
empirically driven and theoretically grounded practice accounts of international 
legal processes can thrive. 
C. Identify Activity 
In addition to locating reality, the study of practices in international law 
requires a researcher to single out analytically significant work activity. In this 
pursuit it is essential to appreciate that practices 
are not objects, they are not in the heads of people, and they are not stored in routines 
or programmes. Practices only exist to the extent that they are enacted and re-
enacted. Focusing on practices is thus taking the social and material doing (of 
something: doing is never objectless) as the main focus of the inquiry.
319
 
It follows that the identification of activity for the purpose of observation and 
interpretation is an integral methodological task for the study of practices in 
international law. Generally speaking, the ensembles of patterned activities that 
constitute practices can come in very different shapes and sizes, which is what 
makes the interpretive task of identification so important. “These activities may 
be intentional or unintentional, interpersonally cooperative or antagonistic, but 
they are inherently multifaceted, woven of cognitive, emotional, semiotic, 
appreciative, normative, and material components, which carry different 
valences in different contexts.”320 
I use the term “activity” in order to draw attention to the ontological 
relationship between actions and practices which different theories render very 
differently. Rationalist theories, as Schatzki reminds us, “accord priority to 
action, tying the identity of particular actions to properties of the individuals 
who perform them (e.g., goals, intentions, and other mental states), and treat 
practices as contingent agglomerations of already constituted actions.”321 
Practice theories, by contrast, treat practices as ontologically prior to actions: 
“Whereas on practice accounts the actions that comprise a practice are 
governed essentially by something in common, those comprising social 
phenomena on individualist analyses are governed by the conjunction of the 
relevant, only circumstantially identical or interwoven properties of 
individuals.”322 The challenge for the field researcher (as well as for practice-
 
 319.  Id. at 219–21. 
 320.  Charles Camic, Neil Gross & Michèle Lamont, Introduction: The Study of Social Knowledge 
Making, in SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING 1, 7 (Charles Camic et al. eds., 2011). 
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 322.  Id. 
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oriented scholars not inclined to undertake primary research), then, is not only 
to identify legally relevant activities but also to figure out whether they are 
merely actions or whether they combine to form something more socially 
meaningful. 
In making this determination, all practice theorists give pride of place to 
bodily comportment. Homo practicus is understood as both a carrier and 
performer of practices. When looking for activity worthy of interpretation, a 
great deal of attention must therefore be placed on the skills involved in a 
practice. “From a practice perspective, knowledge is conceived largely as a form 
of mastery that is expressed in the capacity to carry out a social and material 
activity.”323 For example, in the case of international adjudication, a practice 
that can be easily disaggregated in terms of its performative logic is that of 
representing international law in the courtroom. But performances are also at 
work at a less obvious level; they attach to all kinds of practices. As Nicolini 
notes, 
All practice theories . . . leave space for initiative, creativity, and individual 
performance. These are in fact necessary, as performing a practice always requires 
adapting to new circumstances so that practising is neither mindless repetition nor 
complete invention. Yet individual performances take place and are intelligible only 
as part of an ongoing practice.
324
 
The upshot of this discussion is that researchers, when looking to make 
visible practices of international law, should think of activity in a 
nonconventional way. Describing ad nauseam international legal activity will 
not suffice. This is not what the application of practice theory to international 
law demands. Nicolini puts it aptly: 
The mere ‘a-theoretical’ cataloguing of what practitioners do may be an exciting 
endeavour for academics who are unfamiliar with the specific occupation, but it sheds 
little light on the meaning of the work that goes into it, what makes it possible, why it 
is the way it is, and how it contributes to, or interferes with, the production of 
organizational life. In other words, listing and enumerating practices by taking them at 
face-value constitutes a weak approach to practice. Such a descriptive and a-
theoretical way of addressing practice, which builds on the misleading assumption that 
practice is self-explanatory, is scarcely capable of providing [any analytically useful 
insights]. It is also likely to be conductive to a form of social science that is scarcely 
relevant, as once the excitement and surprise of learning about an exotic occupation 
wears out, we are left with a ‘so what’ question, as are the practitioners.
325
 
In other words, when identifying activities, researchers would be well-
advised to adopt a self-consciously analytical stance. As one theorist writes, 
It is always necessary to ask what disposes people to enact the practices they do, how 
and when they do; and their aims, their lived experience and their inherited 
knowledge will surely figure amongst the factors of interest here. But it is not just a 
matter of asking what contingencies incline people to enact, or not to enact, practices, 
as if they exist like tools in a toolbox and it is merely a matter of explaining when and 
why one or another is picked out. The relationship of practices and people is far more 
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intimate and profound than this.
326
 
This brings us to the methodological imperative to reveal meaning in the study 
of practices. 
D. Reveal Meaning 
The “study of work as it happens”—Barbara Czarniawska’s evocative label 
for practice theory—revolves centrally around a search for social meanings.327 
As one scholar writes, “the identity of a practice depends not only on what 
people do, but also on the significance of those actions.”328 The search for 
significance—or meaning—in international law and elsewhere requires a great 
deal of attunedness to the variety of backgrounds and goings-on that one 
encounters in a given research setting, and an ability to notice the little things 
within it (to the extent that they are relevant for making sense of the practice 
under investigation). This methodological advice runs counter to positivist 
approaches to international law where parsimony, not texture, is valued above 
all else. And yet I agree with Nicolini who believes that “good social science 
makes the world more complex, not simpler. Thicker, not thinner, descriptions 
are the aim of good social science. And so it should be in the attempt to 
understand practices.”329 Drawing on the philosopher of science Isabelle 
Stengers, Nicolini further claims that “Good science, no matter from which 
discipline, enriches the ingredients that make up the multi-faceted universe in 
which we live and makes us more articulate and capable of perceiving 
differences (and thus meaning).”330 
But what, exactly, do I mean by “meaning”? By saying that practices are 
inherently meaningful, practice theorists express that the patterned activity 
comprising practices stands in relation to both subjective beliefs and cultural 
assumptions about the nature of social life. The idea, coming out of the 
philosophical tradition of naturalism, is that social behavior is not linear, but 
constantly constructed and reconstructed by individuals in response to the 
interpretations of the situations in which they find themselves. To the extent 
that we believe this to be the case—and that we are skeptical of the alternative 
view that the world is wholly explicable in objective terms alone—it is 
incumbent on us to figure out exactly what it is that moves particular 
individuals in international legal settings to act, knowingly or otherwise, in the 
diverse manners that they do, and why they consider their behavior(s) 
appropriate in terms of their subjective beliefs and cultural assumptions. As the 
philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright observed more than three decades ago, 
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“The social scientist must understand the ‘meaning’ of the behavioral data 
which he registers in order to turn them into social facts. He achieves this 
understanding by describing (interpreting) the data in terms of the concepts and 
rules which determine the ‘social reality’ of the agents whom he studies.”331 
Most crucially, insisted von Wright, 
The description, and explanation, of social behavior must employ the same conceptual 
framework as the social agents themselves. For this reason the social scientist cannot 
remain an outsider in relation to his object of study in the same sense in which a 
natural scientist can. This is the core conceptual truth, one could say, in the 
psychologist’s doctrine of “empathy.” Empathetic understanding is not a “feeling”; it 
is an ability to participate in a “form of life.”
332
 
It was precisely this ability that Max Weber, at the turn of the twentieth 
century, famously associated with the methodological technique of Verstehen, 
or interpretive understanding.333 
In our own time, the legal scholar Lawrence Lessig, better known for his 
writings on technology, delivered a spirited argument in favor of taking 
meaning more seriously in legal research.334 The following, historical illustration 
formed part of his argument. Though unrelated to international law, it is worth 
repeating verbatim because it nicely illustrates the analytical merit of 
ideographic reasoning relative to nomothetic reasoning: 
In 1856, Preston Brooks caned Charles Sumner on the floor of the U.S. Senate. [A 
rationalist explanation] might speak of the costs this caning created. There is a fairly 
solid anti-battering norm in most civilized societies. Sumner suffered the costs of being 
battered; Brooks suffered the costs of being a batterer. [A rationalist explanation] 
might calibrate the harm to Sumner according to the harm that any victim of a 
mugging might suffer. 
But the costs of this action—raising a cane and battering another with it—have only a 
slight relation to the costs of a mugging. What was significant in the caning was not the 
deviation from a norm against battery. Its significance was its meaning. Caning was 
how a master treated a slave; it expressed the presumption that the social status of the 
victim was below the social status of the attacker. Caning expressed something by the 
very choice of weapons used, in the same way that a challenge to a duel would have. A 
challenge to duel would have meant that the challenger considered the challenged 
either his equal or his superior. The challenge to duel would have expressed this 
respect. Depending upon the balance of the social context, it is plausible that the 
victim of a caning is worse off than the wounded victim of a duel: the victim of a duel 
suffers only the risk of corporal injury, whereas the victim of a caning suffers certain 
social injury as well. [A purely rationalist explanation] misses this distinction. The 
price of caning is a function of the action and the contextual understandings behind it. 
[A rationalist explanation] focuses on the action and ignores the context. Meaning talk 
focuses on both. [A rationalist explanation] speaks of the price of behaviors; meaning 
talk speaks of prices in particular contexts. [A rationalist explanation] abstracts; 
 
 331.  GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 28 (1971). 
 332.  Id. at 28–29. 
 333.  MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 4–22 
(Univ. of Cal. 1978) (1922). For the best discussion by far, see FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER’S 
METHODOLOGY: THE UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (1997). 
 334.  See generally Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 
(1996). 
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meaning talk makes contingent.
335
 
This insight is hardly revolutionary; anthropologists have founded an entire 
discipline on its back. And yet, the number of scholars who have embarked on 
quests for meaning in international law remains regrettably small.336 One 
methodological technique of many that is available to the researcher of 
practices in international law seeking to reveal meaning is that of 
“shadowing:”337 
By following practitioners, researchers can . . . attain an insider’s view of the patterns 
of relationship[s], the different perspectives among co-participants—who is who and 
who knows what—the interests at stake, and how these different perspectives, usually 
sustained by specific discourses, are worked together, aligned, or played against each 
other, so creating differential power positions in the field. By the same token, 
researchers can also identify who occupies the different positions made available by 
the activity, and appreciate the expectations and privileges that come with them.
338
 
Needless to say, the technique of shadowing is not only suitable for the 
excavation of meanings but for enacting some of the other methodological 
guidelines as well. 
E. Investigate Context 
The methodological requirement of contextual research on international 
law is designed to home in on the centrality of the particular. For Flyvbjerg and 
others convinced that practice-based reasoning is the way forward for both 
academic and applied scholarship, 
[w]hat has been called the “primacy of context” follows from the empirical fact that in 
the history of science, human action has shown itself to be irreducible to predefined 
elements and rules unconnected to interpretation. Therefore, it has been impossible to 
derive praxis from first principles and theory. Praxis has always been contingent on 
context-dependent judgment, on situational ethics.”
339
 
This is so, they say, because it is “the small, local context, which gives 
phenomena their immediate meaning.”340 And the search for meaning, as we 
have seen, is an important element in the ontology of practices in international 
law. At the same time, as Neumann noted, every theory of practice under the 
sun has been plagued by the methodological challenge “of how to establish the 
validity of its findings, of how to generalise.”341 
 
 335.  Id. at 2183. 
 336.  For an overview of this fledgling literature, see Richard Ashby Wilson, Tyrannosaurus Lex: 
The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 342 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry 
eds., 2007). 
 337.  BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA, SHADOWING AND OTHER TECHNIQUES FOR DOING FIELDWORK 
IN MODERN SOCIETIES (2007) (discussing and illustrating an array of ethnographic techniques for 
studying people on the move). Other techniques can be consulted in leading anthropology textbooks, 
especially those dedicated specifically to ethnography. A good starting point is MARTYN 
HAMMERSLEY & PAUL ATKINSON, ETHNOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE (3d ed. 2007).  
 338.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 222. 
 339.  FLYVBJERG, supra note 126, at 136. 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn, supra note 198, at 633. 
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 My requirement of contextual analysis implies a deliberate eschewing of 
generalization about the practice of international law. With this guideline, I do 
not mean to disparage the indispensable quest for general statements about 
how international law works. Nor do I believe that insights derived with the 
help of practice-oriented reasoning are inherently incapable of being scaled up 
to the level of statistical analysis, and thus to nomothetic reasoning in search of 
covering law-style statements about what Barbara Koremenos recently called 
“the continent of international law.”342 My point is a different one: By 
sidestepping the immediate (as opposed to long-term) preoccupation with 
generalization, scholars of international legal practices have a chance of 
becoming more attuned to noticing, and to registering, what is right in front of 
them without feeling the need to justify that what they are doing is intellectually 
worthwhile in any larger scheme of things, which nowadays increasingly means 
saying something of supposedly universal application. To give an example, if a 
scholar were to study, from the vantage point of practice theory, the choices 
justices make in an international adjudicative setting, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), she would be best served to concentrate fully 
on the doings and sayings of the individuals and groups in Strasbourg who are 
living and breathing the life of international human-rights law than to abstract 
from these local lives of international law in search of more universal patterns 
of international adjudication. The latter quest is honorable and important and 
has found many adherents, especially in the last fifteen or so years. At the same 
time, it glosses over, by necessity, the inner workings of, in our example, the 
ECHR. Arguably, an in-depth and closely observed study of the everyday legal 
practices of even a subset of the forty-seven judges of the ECHR chambers 
(and their legal teams) would be no less, and possibly even more, illuminating 
than a coarse-grained study of international legal action that treats international 
courts and tribunals as virtually indistinguishable unitary actors. 
Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating for a return in the study of 
international law to descriptive accounts without theoretical reflection. Quite 
the contrary. Consider, by way of analogy, the question of power and its study 
in the international system. “The main question,” submits Flyvbjerg, “is not 
only the Weberian: ‘Who governs?’ posed by Robert Dahl and most other 
students of power. It is also the Nietzschean question: What ‘governmental 
rationalities’ are at work when those who govern govern?”343 On this more 
complicated understanding of power, which in its contemporary variant owes to 
the pioneering work of Foucault, power is thought of as 
a dense net of omnipresent relations and not only as localized in ‘centers’ and 
institutions, or as an entity one can “possess.” . . . Knowledge and power, truth and 
power, rationality and power are analytically inseparable from each other; power 
produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power. . . . The central question is how 
power is exercised, and not only who has power, and why they have it; the focus in on 
 
 342.  Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law, 57 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 653, 655 
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1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:29 AM 
Nos. 3 & 4 2013] THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 
process in addition to structure [and agency].
344
 
Applied to the study of international law, such an analytical perspective 
demands nothing less than what we might call an archeology of power, by which 
I mean a specific and comprehensive account of all rules, norms, and processes 
that govern relations between and among those agents affected—as subjects, 
objects, or intermediaries—by the practice in the setting under investigation. 
Accounts can be considered specific to the extent that they avoid generalizing 
descriptions of power dynamics and focus on, say a particular chamber of 
judges during a specified and delimited period of time. Accounts will be 
comprehensive to the extent that they do not merely describe the visible 
distribution of power, but dig up the entire field of power in the context 
selected for analysis, thus also excavating hidden or otherwise concealed forms 
of domination. It is this kind of analytical commitment to the interpretive study 
of international law, exemplified in the context of a study of power, that my 
fifth methodological guideline captures and seeks to inspire. 
Ultimately, to sum up this discussion of methodological guidelines, the study 
of practices in international law necessitates a combination of “zooming in” and 
“zooming out.” That is, a practice-oriented approach to the study of 
international law 
requires first that we zoom in on the details of the accomplishment of a practice in a 
specific place to make sense of the local accomplishment of the practice and the other 
more or less distant activities. This is followed by, and alternated with, a zooming out 
movement through which we expand the scope of the observation following the trails 
of connections between practices and their products. The iterative zooming in and out 
stops when we can provide a convincing and defensible account of both the practice 
and its effects on the dynamics of organizing, showing how that which is local . . . 
contributes to the generation of broader effects . . . . Because the zooming in and out 
is achieved by switching theoretical lenses, the result is both a representation of 
practice and an exercise of diffraction whereby understanding is enriched through 
reading the results of one form of theorization through another.
345
 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
By relating theory to the practice of international law, I have sought to 
make a contribution to the study of international courts and tribunals in 
general, and to the study of the ICC in particular. The quest is part and parcel 
of what Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg recently termed “the empirical 
turn in international legal scholarship.”346 Although not widely pursued in the 
study of international law, practice theory, in all of its guises, offers numerous 
analytical entry points for making sense of international legal phenomena. 
Indeed the sociologists Charles Samic, Neil Gross, and Michèle Lamont 
recently argued that practice-oriented reasoning is amenable to answering 
 
 344.  Id. at 131–32. 
 345.  NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 219. 
 346.  Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 
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Although different theories of practice manage the interrelationships among 
these emphases differently—and thus would be located in different quadrants in 
figure 2—all can be made eminently usable for capturing the social lives of 
international law. This is so because 
a practice-oriented framework can accommodate a variety of theories and paradigms 
in offering a large menu for choice: (1) whether to concentrate on the material or 
symbolic dimensions of practice, or both; (2) whether to focus on the structural or 
agential nature of practice, or both; (3) whether to look into the stabilizing or dynamic 
aspects of practice, or both; (4) whether to treat practice as explanandum or 
explanans, or both; (5) if explanandum, what other factors (whatever their ontological 
status) to conjure in explaining the lifecycle of practice; (6) if explanans, what other 
determinants to add on to practices themselves in explaining transformation; (7) if 
explanans, what type of interplay of practices is generating transformations; and (8) if 
explanans, what transformation the ordinary unfolding of practice produces.
348
 
 
However, because the study of practices in international law is still a very 
new proposition, a great deal of translational research is required, especially 
because practice theorists in the humanities and social sciences have not, as we 
have seen, been overly keen to delve into the weeds of empirical life. As one 
scholar observes, “In spite of building on the shoulders of giants, practice 
theory is still in its infancy and whether it will ever become a powerful 
bandwagon is yet to be determined. Most importantly, the practice approach is 
still largely untested.”349 Among the major theorists, Bourdieu has arguably 
come closest to linking close observations of the everyday to theoretical 
reflection, and yet even his accounts have been subjected to endless criticism, 
notably on methodological grounds. Consequently, “the proof of the [analytical 
power of the] approach will be in the capacity of future texts to represent 
practice,” in the domain of international law and elsewhere, “in a rich and 
insightful way. Therefore, the way forward is, first and foremost, to develop the 
approach by using it.”350 I and the other contributors to this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems have sought to do just that. 
Yet some scholars circumspect about the promise of practice-oriented 
research designs in the study of the international system have cautioned that 
“most of us, young and old, lack experience of the big issues of international 
political life.”351 If we believe the cautioner, the IR scholar Chris Brown, 
[t]his is a problem for proponents of the ‘practice turn’ as much as for those who rely 
on practical wisdom. Both the ‘practice turn’ and the idea of practical reason rest on 
notions of knowing how to go on in the world, and whether this ability is seen as 
resting on acquired dispositions or the ability to reason from experience, it cannot be 
learnt only from books.
352
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It goes without saying that book knowledge is insufficient for generating 
knowledge about the power of practices in the international system. Even so, I 
am not convinced that experience is quite as difficult to come by as Brown 
suggests. I propose that the supposed problem is more imagined than real. It 
certainly is a problem for those metatheoretical IL and IR scholars whose 
research is rooted in deskwork rather than fieldwork. It is considerably less 
problematic a proposition for anyone steeped in qualitative methods, from 
archival to observational research. In other words, the ostensible problem is 
methodological in nature, not epistemological. This being so, it can be 
addressed, if not entirely solved, with recourse to the methodology of the social 
sciences, especially the increasingly sophisticated literature on small-n 
research.353 
Put differently, practices can be made known. Scores of textbooks in 
anthropology have addressed the perennial challenge of “access.”354 It also bears 
emphasizing that many a setting outside of the field of IR is  considerably more 
challenging—not to mention dangerous—than working for extended periods of 
time alongside diplomats and otherwise distinguished professionals in the world 
of international law. This is not to say that Brown does not have a point. He is 
correct to argue that access to “high level” practices is usually prohibitive. 
However, an abundance of practical knowledge is located well below the higher 
echelons of international politics. The same applies to the world of international 
law. In fact, often much more useful knowledge is to be collected where power 
does not formally reside, or at least not in its most concentrated form. 
As a matter of fact, the imagined problem only becomes real if the 
disciplines and subfields directed toward the study of international law—chiefly 
IL and IR—are content with the very limited methodological training they 
provide and the disregard for rigorous and in-depth field research they 
generally espouse. It is unheard of in other disciplines (for example, 
anthropology) and subfields (for example, comparative politics) to throw up 
one’s hands simply because access to potential evidence is difficult. 
Anthropologists do not shy away from difficult settings and often devote years 
to immersing themselves in previously alien or otherwise unfamiliar research 
sites. In anthropology, at least in its cultural variant, immersion continues to be 
a sine qua non of doctoral training. Historians dig deep into archives, almost 
always acquiring over the course of several years language and other skills 
necessary for deciphering human artifacts that they did not theretofore possess. 
It stands to reason that IL and IR scholars—and anyone else interested in 
“reading” international law in this sense—can be taught to do the same. 
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By making a case for a practice-based approach to the empirical analysis of 
the ICC, I have sought to lay some of the theoretical and methodological 
groundwork for more ideographic research on the determinants of international 
law, by which I mean scholarship that is more rigorously descriptive of what 
Karl Llewellyn called the “law-crafts” than we have been accustomed to. By 
complementing the increasingly nomothetic study of international law with 
ideographic ways of seeing the everyday life of international lawyers, we stand 
to gain a richer, more realistic understanding of how international law works. 
 
